Indian interest in
Brig Asif Haroon Raja
Brig AsifIndia succeeded in creating
When
In the meanwhile another organisation MQM under Altaf Hussain surfaced in
The CIA and MI-6 also had a role in giving added muscle to the MQM; it was induced by dangling the carrot of converting
Though Pak-US closeness in 1980s due to Afghan war upset Indian designs, RAW continued with its covert operations in rural and urban Sindh and succeeded in accentuating antagonism between old and new Sindhis. Side by side,
Within this narrowest waistline, road-rail communication run perilously close to the border and its interdiction severs Sindh from rest of the country. Umarkot-Chhor sector leading to
Having acquired the requisite desert capability, an attempt was made in 1985-86 in the form of Exercise Brass-tacks which was conducted perilously close to our border in the desert belt. It fizzled out because of
With the coming in of George Bush in power in January 2001, talk of balkanisation of
In December 2007 military standoff which continued till May 2008, bulk of Indian strike formations had assembled in areas opposite to the Reti-Rahimyar Khan waistline in Kishangarh area with the hope that with a little push, restive Sindh would revolt. Although
Laid down objectives will be achieved preferably through covert means alone supplemented by Kerry-Lugar bill, or limited attacks by Indian forces, or combination of limited attacks and all out Indo-Pak war depending upon the success achieved in battle of frontiers and neutralisation of our nukes. Sudden flurry of terrorist attacks in Peshawar, Kohat, Shangla, Lahore, GHQ and Islamabad and maximisation of pressure to commence operation in Waziristan as well as in South Punjab, desire to attack alleged Afghan Taliban Shura with drones in Balochistan and sudden closure of security check posts by Afghan government along its border attached with Bajaur are not without ulterior motives. I repeat my warning that November-December will be critical. Although operation in South Waziristan has started with a bang, however, our fight against terrorists must not be at the cost of lowering our operational preparedness against our arch enemy which has never missed an opportunity to harm Pakistan.I will write about Indian war plan in my next article.
Courtesy: Opinion-maker
M Saeed Khalid
October 17, 2009
After days of blowing hot and cold, the Indians have signalled that they are ready to talk to Pakistan. Only a few days back, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told journalists that the existing state of bilateral relations was not conducive to a move ahead. We should critically analyse the prospects of talks being scheduled at foreign ministers or foreign secretaries level.
Why did Mr Singh sound so pessimistic only a few weeks after trying to convince his MPs that some talks with Pakistan were better than no talks after the two prime ministers had agreed in Egypt that talks would go ahead to end the hiatus resulting from the November mayhem in Mumbai. Mr Singh's remarks were amplified by claims of Indian ministers about the lack of action by Pakistan on India's demands concerning Hafiz Saeed and others.
The Indian side appeared to be turning its back on a process that brought a tangible improvement in relations with Pakistan. India may have been miffed at the slow progress in prosecuting those it holds responsible for the Mumbai attack. But was that enough reason to abandon the composite dialogue, which has been a useful format to address contentious matters between the two nations, including terrorist threats? Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gilani commented that suspension of the dialogue only benefited the terrorists.
In order to fully understand India's reticence on engaging Pakistan, we may have to look beyond our bilateral relations. The United States has played a major role in facilitating the India-Pakistan dialogue, to create conditions which would allow Pakistan to deal effectively with terrorism on its western borders in an atmosphere of easing tensions with India. In parallel, Washington had moved its strategic partnership with India to new heights, the civil nuclear accord being its centrepiece. This American role had an unannounced caveat whereby a downturn in Indo-American friendship would collaterally damage the dialogue process with Pakistan unless it had gathered considerable traction of its own. In reality, the Mumbai killings proved to be a body blow to the peace process between the two countries, reminding everyone how shooting outside the Indian Parliament in December 2001 had brought the two sides to the precipice.
The dialogue process was launched as a mechanism of engagement which would enable the two countries to resolve disputes and enter into an interlocking system of CBMs to prevent another warlike situation. The process survived the BJP's departure from power because the Bush administration continued to support it while maintaining its policy of building a special relationship with India. The US also continued to place her bets on President Musharraf remaining at the top of a post-election setup in Pakistan.
All that changed between August 2008 and January 2009, with both Musharraf and Bush leaving office. In a sense, the composite dialogue has been orphaned. It could have been brought up by foster parents if Mumbai had not happened. But behind the scenes, what may have hurt the chances of its revival is the antipathy between the new US administration and the Indian leadership, rooted in serious policy differences which show no sign of abating. As a result, a structured dialogue with Pakistan no longer carries the value addition in the eyes of the Indian leadership that it had in the Bush era.
Traditionally, Democrats in the US were considered friends of India while the Republicans were seen tilting towards Pakistan. The "tilt" came to an end under Bush Sr. However, it was during the eight-year presidency of Bush Jr. that we witnessed a remarkable overture in the direction of India, steered by Ambassador Robert Blackwill in New Delhi, and fully supported by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Her move to the State Department in the second term of Bush further reinforced the India initiative with more determined efforts to push through Congress the India-US civil nuclear accord despite objections from the non-proliferation lobby.
This unusual warming for India was generally attributed to the US desire to build India as a counterweight to China. Publicly, Washington had no hesitation in taking the posture that it wanted to "help" India become a global power and that could happen if New Delhi resolved the outstanding differences with its smaller neighbours. Hence, the importance of resolving disputes with Pakistan, notably the one over Jammu and Kashmir.
It is not clear how seriously India took the US mantra. But it is well known that India was mightily annoyed when candidate Obama sought to link success in the fight against terrorism to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. For India, Obama erred further by appointing a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with purported outreach to India. Alongside, a whole range of differences have come to the surface over the past few months.
Obama is considered too protectionist for India's outsourcing business. India is unhappy over limits on work visas for its skilled manpower. Rice, who spearheaded the push for a strategic partnership with India, has been replaced by Hillary Clinton, who adores India and yet is criticised for not including India in her first Asian tour. To many in India, the Obama administration seems to be lacking in enthusiasm for a speedy implementation of the civil nuclear accord.
And why is there so much pressure on India about signing the CTBT that would deprive it of possibilities of further nuclear testing? To complicate life further, the existing differences over WTO negotiations and other trade issues could get worse, dampening the mutual desire to keep the special relationship going. India may be disappointed over America's inability to ensure Pakistan's "compliance" with India's wish list regarding jihadi outfits. Finally, the claims by India about infiltration across the LoC would again indirectly give cause for complaint that the US is not exerting enough pressure on Pakistan.
This inventory of Indo-US irritants shows how far things have moved from the mutual admiration seen during the Bush presidency. Viewed from Pakistan's perspective, the framework of India-Pakistan détente, built with US support, may not survive if the Indo-American alliance suffers a setback. India may consider itself liberated from the commitments undertaken so far and feel free to deal with Pakistan as it did before the composite dialogue, piece by piece, as expedient under India's perceived national mood.
But Pakistan need not be overly regretful if the dialogue process is pushed to the backburner because, as neighbours, we have to conduct relations with India even if the previous arrangement is disowned by it due to multiple reasons.
Rather than repeatedly seeking India's return to the composite-dialogue process, we need to modulate our public insistence on talks, to disabuse India of the notion that they would be doing a favour just by sitting across the table from us. India will come back to the composite form if it sees some added value. If not, US insistence can persuade the Indian side to grudgingly agree to some form of talks in the coming months. However, progress in the talks will be tied by New Delhi to court proceedings in Pakistan against those suspected of links to the Mumbai attacks.
India should realise that the onus for providing evidence would largely be on New Delhi. Anti-terrorism court proceedings can be very long and satisfaction is not guaranteed. The two governments, therefore, need to take other steps to safeguard the gains made through the dialogue process. They owe it to their people, with or without America's urging, to avoid returning to a sterile period in their bilateral relations.
Courtesy: The News
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A joint fight against terror
16 Oct, 2009
NEW DELHI should realise that the road to Beijing goes through Islamabad. This is what a Pakistan foreign minister told me many years ago. There is some truth in this even today.
Likewise, Islamabad would have known by now that its route to Kabul lies through New Delhi. This is not to suggest that India is helping Afghanistan in its armed struggle against the Taliban. What it means is that New Delhi can wield influence over Kabul.
The hospital it has built in Kabul and the roads and power transmission lines it has laid there despite the killings of Indian engineers and workers have earned the Manmohan Singh government the trust of an average Afghan. This goodwill can benefit Islamabad if it can have even a workable relationship with New Delhi.
Another attack on India’s embassy in Kabul recently is nothing new from the point of view of the Taliban who regard India as their enemy and economic development an anti-war measure. But the alleged role of the ISI in such attacks is difficult to comprehend.
Mistrust between India and Pakistan clouds judgment. Yet both have known to their cost that the Taliban consider them their enemy. The recent attack on the army headquarters at Rawalpindi reconfirms the fact that when it comes to causing harm, the Taliban make no distinction between Islamic Pakistan and secular India.
Why have not New Delhi and Islamabad sat together to plan a common strategy? Kashmir does not have to be sorted out before solving other problems. The situation in Afghanistan is too serious for further delay. Every gain that the Taliban make in Pakistan is at the expense of India’s security. But certain irritants need to be removed. Islamabad should give up the idea of having Afghanistan as its area of strategic depth.
Kabul lives under the fear that Islamabad is out to belittle or destroy it. Just as the stability of Pakistan is essential for the stability of India, Afghanistan’s viability is necessary for Pakistan’s viability. Essentially, the fight against the Taliban is the fight for a free world.
But the most important step for India and Pakistan is joint, concerted action against the Taliban. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said at a press conference in Mumbai: “If we work together to deal with this menace (terrorism), a [larger] good can come out of it.”
Pakistan’s allegation that India is trying to export terrorism does not help the situation. Manmohan Singh’s charactersing it as “a false accusation” should set doubts in Pakistan at rest. Manmohan Singh has seldom personally rubbished a statement. The real problem is Gen Stanley McChrystal’s assessment. The top US commander in Afghanistan has said that India was adding to regional tensions and encouraging counter-measures. At the same time, it was indicated that Indian activities benefit the Afghan people. The economic measures which New Delhi has undertaken in Afghanistan are bound to endear India in the eyes of the Afghans.
The American commander’s assessment can be a talking point between New Delhi and Islamabad. When both agree that the Taliban are the biggest menace they can surely find a common strategy for joint action. They can adopt different ways, economic or military, but they should have one policy to tackle the Taliban.
Pakistan’s reluctance to move troops from the Indian border to Afghanistan is understandable. Islamabad is making the same point which New Delhi was making when it was in the midst of a war with China in 1962. Pakistan has argued that while it is concentrating its full attention on fighting the Taliban, India should not in any way be disturbing it on the border.
In 1962, both US President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan had told Gen Ayub not to take such steps as would in any way distract New Delhi’s attention from fighting against China. Jawaharlal Nehru’s fear was that Ayub would march into Kashmir once India withdrew its forces from the border with Pakistan. Gen P.N. Thapar, chief of the Indian army, asked for the government’s permission to move the troops from the Pakistan border to the theatre of war in Assam.
Washington and London talked to Islamabad and assured New Delhi on Pakistan’s behalf that it would not attack India. Only then did India withdraw one division from the Pakistan border. Krishna Menon, then India’s defence minister, was opposed to the move. He considered Pakistan more of an enemy than China. Still Thapar withdrew the troops after getting Nehru’s permission.
Ayub did not open a second front, although it was an opportune moment for him to do so. Still Ayub used the opportunity to give China the northern areas of Kashmir, then under Pakistan. He wanted to establish closer relations with Beijing. Islamabad has followed that policy strictly.
Pakistani rulers, like Nehru, have conveyed more or less the same fears in similar words to the Americans who have been asked to guarantee that New Delhi would do nothing if Pakistan withdrew its troops from the border with India. Islamabad is far from satisfied by mere statements that there is no question of India attacking Pakistan. Still, with all the assurances, Islamabad has hardly withdrawn any forces from the border with India.
Whatever the situation and from wherever you start, you find loads of mistrust. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no alternative to rapprochement between India and Pakistan. President Obama once talked about a regional solution to Afghanistan and other problems between the countries. Little has happened on that front so far.
courtesy: Dawn
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India and Pakistan Fail to Restart Negotiations
By:NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Sep 28,2009
UNITED NATIONS — An attempt by India and Pakistan to agree on resuming either open or back channel negotiations over the full range of their differences stalled on Sunday stuck once more by the fallout from the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai by Pakistani militants.After meeting for nearly two hours on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly the foreign ministers of the two countries Shah Mahmood Qureshi of Pakistan and S.M.Krishna of India said both sides endorsed the idea of resuming negotiations but failed to concur on a timetable.
India without making it an outright condition that resuming talks depended on Pakistan’s prosecuting of those responsible for the Mumbai attacks made clear that substantial progress would be required before negotiations could restart said Salman Bashir Pakistan’s foreign secretary the No.2 in the ministry.“It has not been spelled out in that manner but they want to see some visible action ” Mr.Bashir told reporters at a hotel in Midtown Manhattan where the talks were held.Pakistan had proposed restarting talks before year’s end an idea the Indians did not reject outright but did not accept either he said.
Militants of the Pakistani based group Lashkar e Taiba killed 163 people while rampaging through downtown Mumbai India’s financial capital last November.After repeated delays the trial of eight men accused of helping plan the attack is due to start in Pakistan on Saturday but the Indian government has demanded that the Pakistanis reach higher in the group’s ranks.Both Indian and Western officials blame Hafez Saeed the founder of Lashkar for masterminding the attacks.He was released from house arrest but Mr.Qureshi said he was still being questioned based on evidence presented to the Pakistanis.
India seeks strengthened relations with Pakistan Mr.Krishna said but its neighbor’s fight against terrorist groups needed time to “gather greater momentum.” It is impossible that so few could have been responsible for attacks on the scale of those carried out in Mumbai he said.“We have continuing concerns about the threat from extremism and terrorist groups in Pakistan ” Mr.Krishna said.
The Indian government faced a wave of public criticism last summer after the two countries first issued a joint statement saying they would work on resuming talks.Indians remain unconvinced that the Pakistani government particularly the military and intelligence services have come to see the extremists as a greater threat than India and the territorial fight over Kashmir.The two countries have fought three wars since the violent partition of British India in 1947 but a fourth could have grave consequences given that both now possess nuclear missiles.
Pakistan’s government realizes that its Indian counterpart faces a dubious public Mr.Qureshi said so the Pakistani government will work to change Indian public opinion.Pakistani security forces are hunting about 20 men accused of participating in the Mumbai attack who remain at large he said adding that his country was serious about cracking down because of the hundreds of terrorist attacks carried out in Pakistan.
Courtesy: New York Times
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One step forward, two steps backwards
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
In a wearingly familiar repeat of the on-off pattern of Pakistan-India engagement the latest twist in the diplomatic game is a lack of agreement on how to proceed with the dialogue.
The hope of meaningful re-engagement held out by the July 15 meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries has been eclipsed by Delhi's apparent backtracking on the Sharm El Sheikh understandings. In a characteristic sub-continental replay, a step forward has been followed by two steps backwards. This has created uncertainty about how the normalisation process can progress.
This situation seems, in turn, to have urged Washington and London to direct their efforts to persuading Pakistan and India to revive the diplomatic back channel without necessarily waiting for the formal dialogue to resume. Delhi's response to these urgings is not yet known. Reactivating this channel minus any agreement on the resumption of the composite dialogue raises a number of questions for Islamabad to consider before embarking on such a course.
The Indian government seems to be in no mood to renew the four-year old peace process that it suspended in November 2008 in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attack. Following the Sharm El Sheikh encounter, Delhi has backpedalled on almost all aspects of the joint statement, which raised a political storm in India orchestrated by the BJP. The most significant aspect of the statement was the de-linking of action on terrorism from the composite dialogue. This saw clashing interpretations by Islamabad and Delhi. Pakistan read this as the decoupling of the formal dialogue from the terrorism issue: talks in other words were not to be conditioned on the latter.
Delhi took the opposite view. In Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's remarks immediately after Sharm El Sheikh, as also in his July 29 address to the Lok Sabha, he insisted that "the resumption of talks cannot be a pre-condition for action against terrorists". Under fire from the BJP, he vehemently denied, during a heated parliamentary debate on the issue on July 30, that he had departed from the position that dialogue could only proceed if Pakistan brought the Mumbai attackers to justice. Delhi has also backtracked on two other obligations prescribed by the joint statement: to share real-time information on future terrorist threats as well as the understanding for the foreign secretaries of the two countries to meet as "frequently as required" to determine the agenda of the future dialogue.
Firstly, the Indian Prime Minister's public warning (at a chief ministers' conference on August 17) of another attack being planned in Pakistan seemed to be at variance with the July 16 statement. This prompted the Foreign Office to call in India's deputy high commissioner to seek information and offer cooperation. It also provided an opportunity to remind Delhi of the Sharm El Sheikh agreement "to share credible and actionable information" on any terrorist threat. This has yet to elicit any response from Delhi. On the second count too the Indian government has been dragging its feet. Islamabad invited the new Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, to Islamabad in the first week of September in pursuance of the July 16 agreement for the two foreign secretaries to meet ahead of the foreign ministers' meeting in New York. Delhi has been prevaricating in its response. Instead it has made vague noises about a meeting on the sidelines of multilateral conferences or the UN General Assembly itself -- thereby suggesting an unwillingness to engage in evolving a substantive agenda for the FMs' meeting. If this backtracking is ascribed to India's internal political dynamics it raises the question why the Congress government, re-elected by a handsome margin in May, has been unable to withstand the BJP-led opposition pressure. Why has it allowed the peace process to so easily become a hostage to domestic politics?
Is part of the explanation found in the fact that Prime Minister Singh does not enjoy sufficient authority in the Congress party itself? Is it attributable to shortcomings in his political management? Having raised the tempo of rhetoric and demands on Pakistan to a fever pitch after Mumbai, did he become a victim of the bellicose climate that his government itself created?
In his address to the Lok Sabha, aimed at allaying misgivings, Mr Singh was defensive and unconvincing. By the time he finished his speech he had yielded more space to the opposition than in standing his own ground. Even erstwhile supporters accused him of engaging in "clumsy diplomacy". The key question this raises for Pakistan is whether internal politics is driving a hardening of the Indian posture? With the BJP whipping up an atmosphere of hostility towards Pakistan, will the Congress government then follow an agenda determined by the opposition? Does the ease with which the government caved in to the hardliners betray political weakness or its own lack of will?
These questions have to be carefully weighed by Islamabad to determine and calibrate its future course of action. Meanwhile Washington and London have renewed their efforts to urge Pakistan and India to resume the backchannel. This had previously worked with the Indian national security adviser, Satinder Lambah (and before him JN Dixit) and Tariq Aziz, a close confidante of former president Pervez Musharraf, acting as the interlocutors. Islamabad may now have to decide when to restart backchannel diplomacy and under what circumstances.
Critics of the backchannel that operated during 2004-2008 objected, with justification, to its opaque nature. They also questioned the extent to which the twin tracks – front and back – functioned in synch. Whatever the merits or demerits of the backchannel, the governments of both countries seem to favour the approach, like their predecessors.
Three factors are important for Islamabad to consider. First, the backchannel was intended in the past to work in tandem with the front channel. Formal structured talks addressed a multilayered, wide-ranging, eight-point agenda covering almost the entire gamut of bilateral ties. The backchannel focused primarily on Kashmir (but also other disputes: Siachen and Sir Creek), to explore the parameters of an eventual settlement.
The idea was that progress achieved in the informal channel would be reflected in the composite dialogue process. Decoupling the two therefore makes little sense; the two tracks have to operate simultaneously, and not sequentially. The backchannel is a supplement and not a substitute for the composite talks.
Moreover if Delhi finds it difficult to resume the formal peace process because of domestic compulsions, how will it summon the political strength to show the flexibility that is required in what is envisaged as a dispute resolution track? If the backchannel is employed just to keep the bilateral communication going, which is happening anyway, this will only devalue a vehicle that is meant for more substantive negotiations.
Second, recommencing only the backchannel in the current environment could turn this into a forum focused only on terrorism, in line with what Delhi has already been hinting i.e. to recast the dialogue around one issue. Even before Sharm El Sheikh Indian officials had privately been saying that talks with Pakistan will now be bound by new limits. On its own any unstructured forum will enable this to happen more easily than a framework for structured talks.
Third, re-launching the backchannel without the formal dialogue in place will wrap the entire process of normalisation in unnecessary secrecy and will likely evoke public suspicion rather than support in both countries. For quiet diplomacy to proceed and be politically tenable, formal dialogue is essential, not least because this process lends legitimacy to agreements that may be reached between the principals through their interlocutors on the backchannel.
The two tracks are for good reason inextricably linked and must therefore be in play together. There is also an opportunity to correct the flaws that critics correctly identified in the manner in which the backchannel was conducted in the past.
For Islamabad the most prudent course for now is to continue to engage the Indians, while adopting a posture of studied cool, rather than haste or over-eagerness to rush into talks, whatever the terms. Peace remains the overarching objective, but the process of movement to sustainable peace requires careful deliberation not unconsidered haste.
Aug 25,2009
Courtesy: The News
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India-Pakistan rivalry
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
India and Pakistan are in a state of active hostility — if not war or at least two proxy wars. At least six of the Pakistan army’s nine corps are on the border with India. Of the six, I Corps and II Corps are heavy armour strike corps. At least seven of the Indian army’s 13 corps are on the border with Pakistan. Of the seven, X Corps and II Corps are powerful strike corps (strike corps is an offensive formation). Additionally, all of India’s holding crops that are directly facing Pakistan also have significant offensive capabilities. In effect, 66 per cent of the Pakistan army’s holding and strike formations are directly facing India. In effect, more than 53 per cent of the Indian army’s holding and strike formations are directly facing Pakistan.
Pakistan maintains — and sustains — critical assets in the northeast that have managed to pin down India’s XV Corps, IX Corps, XVI Corps, XIV Corps, XI Corps, X Corps and II Corps. India’s 4 Armoured Brigade, 340 Mechanised Brigade, 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions, Jaisalmer Air Force Base, Utarlai Air Force Base and Bhuj Air Force Base maintain a threatening-offensive posture. India is actively supporting anti-Pakistan Baloch elements as well as anti-Pakistan Taliban factions. India is bent upon projecting power into Afghanistan thus encircling Pakistan. And, India – post-Operation Parakram — has been investing into a "Cold Start War Doctrine" involving joint operations by the Indian army, air force and navy; eight integrated battle groups with armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support.
For FY 2009, India’s defence spending will rise by close to 50 per cent to a colossal $32.7 billion (according to Jane’s Information Group). India is planning its biggest-ever arms purchases; $11 billion fighter jets, T-90S tanks, Scorpion submarines, Phalcon airborne warning and control system, multi-barrel rocket-launchers and an aircraft carrier. At $32.7 billion India’s defence spending translates into 2.7 per cent of GDP.
For FY 2009, Pakistan’s official defence spending is set at $4.3 billion while unofficial estimates go as high as $7.8 billion. If Pakistan were to match India’s rise we would have to spend more than five per cent of our GDP on defence. For the record, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan spend an overwhelmingly large percentage of their GDP on defence. Iraq, Somalia and Sudan are all — or have been — in a state of civil war. For the record, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia use to spend an overwhelmingly large percentage of their GDP on defence. Soviet Union is no more. Czechoslovakia is no more.
The US and the Soviet Union fought a 50-year Cold War during which the Soviet Union stockpiled some 13,000 active nuclear warheads. In 1991, the US won without even firing a shot. The Soviet Union raced a race that it couldn’t win. The Soviet Union split into 15.
Over the past century, economic development has been all about intense trading. Pakistan has two population centres; central Punjab and Karachi. Central Punjab is a thousand kilometres from the nearest port. Between Karachi and central Punjab is a desert in the east and on west is an area that does not — and cannot — support population concentrations. To develop economically, we must trade. Trade we must. And, the only population concentration to trade with is on our east.
Time — and money — is on India’s side. Composite dialogue among civilians means little — if anything at all. What is needed is a strategic dialogue. How can India be persuaded to pull back its offensive formations? In return for what? How can we use our America leverage in our longer-term interest? We cannot win an arms’ race with India. We ought to race a race that we can win. We can continue to race a race that we are bound to lose. Or, begin a new race that we may be able to win — or at least not lose.
Aug16,2009
Courtesy: The News
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Terms of re-engagement
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
The first encounter between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh since the Mumbai terrorist attack last November marked a tentative thaw in Pakistan-India relations but little else for now.
The June 16 meeting in Yekaterinberg, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, took place in the backdrop of heightened tensions following the Mumbai attack and Delhi's declaration of a halt to the five year old "composite" dialogue. India then set the pre-conditions that Pakistan take action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack and "dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism" for talks to resume.
The suspension of the peace process reinforced the "on-off", "start-stumble-stop" pattern that has characterised the bilateral engagement in a crisis-prone relationship that has been locked in repetitive cycles of sporadic talks, hostility and confrontation.
The latest hiatus in the dialogue occurred despite the commitment made by both countries in a summit level joint statement of April 2005, that they would not allow terrorism to derail the talks. This pledge was reiterated in another joint communiqué in September 2005, in which leaders of the two countries vowed to frustrate any move by terrorists to impede the dialogue.
Delhi's suspension of the formal dialogue in November 2008 mimicked its move in December 2001 in the wake of the terrorist assault on the Indian Parliament , when talks were stalled .They did not resume till the decision at a summit of Indian and Pakistani leaders in January 2004, following a prolonged and unsuccessful exercise in coercive diplomacy by India. Not only has recent history repeated itself but it has underscored the fragility of the peace process that has been so frequently disrupted.
The tone for the Zardari-Singh meeting was set by the Indian leader. In a departure from diplomatic norms, the Indian prime minister publicly declared before the start of the parleys that his "mandate" was to tell his Pakistani interlocutor that "Pakistan should not be used for acts of terrorism against India." This has been widely and correctly read in Pakistan as a public snub to which Mr Zardari curiously failed to respond.
Indian officials went out of their way to insist that this meeting did not presage a resumption of the composite dialogue. Pakistani officials retorted that they had no such expectations in the first place. But tellingly Islamabad did not comment on Mr Singh's assertion that President Zardari made no reference to Kashmir in their meeting.
What came out of the mostly one-on-one meeting was an agreement that the foreign secretaries would meet to discuss the "single subject of terrorism", before the meeting envisaged between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the Egyptian resort of Sharm-el Sheikh on the sidelines of the NAM summit next month. Indian officials said they saw the Foreign Secretaries' meeting as focussed mainly on "stocktaking", to review the steps that Pakistan had taken to address terrorism.
Irrespective of this narrow focus, the diplomatic re-engagement represents a reversal of India's previous stance that it will not dialogue with Islamabad until prior conditions relating to Mumbai are met. What explains this shift even if it remains cloaked in toughspeak?
The answer may lie in a combination of three factors.
One, the behind-the-scenes role played by the US in facilitating the meeting and nudging Delhi towards talks. Washington has understandably been concerned that Indo-Pakistan tensions can derail its plans for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and pursuit of its vital counter-terrorism goals. American officials have been vigorously pressing for an easing of tensions so that Islamabad can focus on fighting militancy on its western border.
During his visit to India on June 10 and 11, US Under-Secretary of State William Burns reiterated the message that Washington supported dialogue between the South Asian neighbours. He also said that a resolution of the Kashmir issue should take into account "the wishes of the Kashmiri people."
This message was subsequently reinforced by President Barack Obama, who said in an interview that "dialogue is the best way to reduce tensions."
A second reason is that Prime Minister Singh has a freer hand to re-engage with Pakistan after his party's resounding victory in his country's elections. In his address to Parliament on June 9, he iterated his intention to "try to make peace with Pakistan again." His strengthened domestic position means he can over ride those who advocate a harder, more bellicose line towards Islamabad.
Three, Delhi's change of stance may reflect the limits of an isolate-Pakistan-internationally policy. After vigorously pursuing a global campaign to vilify Pakistan for the past six months, diminishing returns were setting in for Delhi. In spite of overwhelming international empathy for India in the wake of the terrorist action in Mumbai, Delhi's wont-talk stance did not elicit similar support as time wore on and came to be seen as self defeating. Many read this posture as offering Pakistan a disincentive rather than an incentive to cooperate.
Moreover, non-engagement ultimately becomes unsustainable because a do-nothing approach translates into a gain-nothing one.
The tentative steps towards a diplomatic thaw have been accompanied by indications that Delhi wants to recast the terms of the engagement. Indian officials have purposely leaked the idea that even if formal dialogue is resumed its structure would be "very different" from that pursued earlier. Whether or not this is a pretext for India to wriggle out of meaningful negotiations on Kashmir, any effort to recast an agreed framework for dialogue will be resisted by Islamabad.
It will be a mistake to reconfigure this broad gauge structure for talks that was drawn up in 1997 and sustained for so many years. Although the composite dialogue yielded no agreement on contentious issues and a modest set of confidence building measures, it enabled multi layered talks on the range of issues that reflect the two countries' differing agendas and priorities. Its framework also helped to create a web of multiple interactions between various ministries. Discarding this framework will also risk losing whatever progress was made on different issues during this process.
In any case the framework can hardly be recast to suit one side instead of reflecting mutual agreement. If pushed along these lines Islamabad may prefer to wait it out rather than engage in farcical talks around a unilateral agenda set by Delhi.
Any effort by Delhi to offer a revival of the composite dialogue as a concession to Pakistan should also be resisted by Islamabad. Talks are a means towards an end and a vehicle to achieve an outcome. The dialogue process cannot be held up as a "reward" or quid pro quo. It would be a miscalculation for Delhi to construe Islamabad's consistent call for talks as signalling desperation. Process after all is not sought at the cost of substance.
Be that as it may, there are several reasons that should urge India and Pakistan towards efforts to normalise ties. Four are especially important. First, Pakistan's ability to address the security threat posed by militancy requires calm relations with India. While the militant threat is a clear and present danger Islamabad cannot ignore the more enduring strategic threat that emanates from the adversarial relationship with India. Purposeful talks to address divergences can help mitigate that threat.
Two, Pakistan cannot attain its goal of economic stability and nor can India achieve its full economic potential as also its ambition to secure a seat at the big table while engaged in confrontation. Three, there is a manifest sense in both countries that there is no military solution to the Kashmir dispute or to other problems. Kargil and the 2001-02 military stand off served to confirm this for both sides.
And four, the two countries need to carefully manage their relations in a nuclearized environment. The strategic relationship between the nuclear neighbours remains undefined and potentially unstable. There is no substitute for dialogue to stabilise the nuclear and conventional military relationship.
Durable peace in South Asia will need meaningful talks to establish an architecture of strategic stability in three critical dimensions: finding an acceptable and just solution to Kashmir and institutionalising both nuclear and conventional military restraints.
Ultimately the future of the dialogue, whenever it is renewed, depends on whether the two countries can: a) address and overcome their divergences especially on Kashmir, nuclear-military issues and postures, and Afghanistan, and b) identify and build on the areas of convergence including trade, regional economic cooperation and North-South issues.
June 23,2009
Courtesy: The News
