With the revolution in Information Technology, you are just a click away from entering the door of unlimited knowledge. However, what boggles the mind is just to pick up the desired pearl from the sea of knowledge.
There is no dearth of those websites and blogs where you can go through news items and latest articles covering current affairs. However, this blog is the only one where useful articles collected from national and international newspapers, magazines and websites are organized under relevant category.
All the articles in this blog are related to the hot and simmering problems Pakistan is confronting today. For this purpose, the latest issues have been sorted out and articles have been organized under the relevant category. The issues include:
Kerry-Lugar Bill
Pak-US relations
Indo-Pak relations
Pakistani politics
Balochistan issue
Middle East affairs
Nuclear issues
More issues related to Pakistan would be added as soon as they appear in media. Apart from it, a separate blog is created to cover War On Terror with special relevance to Pakistan which includes latest articles on Afghan issue, Pakistan tribal areas, Waziristan issue, suicide bombings, the role of Indian agencies etc. To view this blog just go to:
http://pakistanandthewaronterror.blogspot.com/
or click ‘view my complete profile’ to access the above blog.
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Pakistani Politics
Democracy under a cloud
by Ayaz Amir
October 16, 2009
Pakistan's American relationship will surely survive the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) but Pakistani democracy --the post Feb 2008 phase of it--may not. One of the stated, indeed touted, aims of this bill is to strengthen democratic institutions. The way it is turning out, the KLB --or rather the manner of its handling by our diplomatic and political wizards --may well be the demolition explosive which brings the house of democracy (our perennial house of cards) down. Think again of the law of unintended consequences.
To be fair to the KLB, it isn't the sole or primary cause of tensions between the Presidency and General Headquarters (GHQ). These tensions predate this controversy and centre on a growing level of mistrust between these two centres of power. But the KLB has brought this mistrust into the open. Pretence has vanished and good manners too are falling by the wayside --if there is any truth to the report that Interior Minister Rehman Malik received a cold shoulder when he went to place a wreath at GHQ (for the dead in the GHQ attack).
Are the knives out completely? Is another night of the long boots at hand? This is pretty melodramatic stuff and we may not be at that stage yet because, with Pakistan engaged so closely with the US in its Taliban wars, it may not quite be the season of unilateral decision-making (also translatable as unilateral adventures). But the signs are ominous and Islamabad's atmosphere is once more heavy with foreboding. The faces of those who matter --or those in the know of such things --are getting noticeably longer.
The Joint Explanatory Statement read out by Senator Kerry with our increasingly quixotic foreign minister in attendance alters nothing. It is merely an explanation of provisions in the bill and, in legal terms, worth less than a statement on a Rs20 stamped paper from the District Courts, Islamabad. Why is the foreign minister so in awe of his American interlocutors? When the KLB was first passed he hailed it as an historic achievement. If only he had checked the temperature in Islamabad he might have saved himself this misplaced bravado. Once again he is pushing his luck by declaring that the Explanatory Statement was "historic". Israel is America's closest ally. No Israeli official behaves like this in Washington.
Of course, if we are looking for a face-saving formula, and provided everyone is on board, including the praetorian element in GHQ, we can paint this as a huge concession--which it is not--and raise a joint toast of acceptance to the KLB. But this wouldn't square with the current mood in GHQ which, if journalist friends in touch with the army are to be believed, is about as dark as ever. The army in one of its super-patriotic moments: it is no laughing matter.
Do I exaggerate? Perhaps. I may have splashed too much colour on the canvas. But this should take away nothing from the fact that things are grim and could get worse if the political class doesn't wake up and arrest the slide. What is GHQ's major grouse against the Presidency? Nothing more damning than the perception that it has a one-on-one relationship with the Americans above and beyond the usual channels of engagement and communication. Singled out on our side as the key players in this relationship are two figures: our man (or suspect, depending on one's taste) in Washington and my friend Herr Rehman Malik in the interior ministry. In the praetorian mind the emotion they arouse the most is suspicion touched with anger.
And why is this out-of-the-loop American connection so worrisome for the guardians more of our ideological than geographical frontiers (for their success in guarding geography has been less than impeccable over the years)? Judging by the buzz emanating from army-savvy media conquistadores, the army high command is worried about two things above all: the CIA's expanding footprint in Pakistan--too many Americans going about business that few people seem to have any clear idea of--and the threat that this may pose to our nuclear programme.
From this it would seem that the army's real objection to the KLB relates not so much to such high-sounding concepts as honour, national dignity and inviolate sovereignty as to the fear that the KLB will provide an enabling environment for the CIA to further expand its presence in Pakistan, thereby posing a greater threat to our nuke arsenal.
The irony couldn't be richer. The world in its more paranoid moments thinks Pakistan's nukes could fall into the hands of the Taliban. The Pakistan army thinks that if there is a threat to our nukes it comes principally from the knights of Langley. At the heart of army angst lies another sliver of suspicion. All previous aid programmes from the US were the property of military regimes: Ayub, Zia, Musharraf. This one is painted for the most part in civilian camouflage and the army doesn't trust the civilians in charge.
Musharraf opened the floodgates to American intrusion and interference. It is only now we are getting to know some of the concessions he gave the Americans, unchecked entry through our airports being one such concession amidst a host of others. The CIA station in Islamabad is amongst the biggest CIA centres in the world. To honour one of its greatest facilitators it should raise a statue to Musharraf in its courtyard. To think that the army endured Musharraf for eight and a half years but its cup of patience vis-à-vis Zardari is spilling over after only a year and a half. Obviously, different standards are at work in GHQ when it comes to evaluating threats to national security: when a military strongman is in the seat of power and when it is democracy's turn to enter the well of death (maut ka koonwan).
And the catalyst of all this, the thing which has brought army suspicions to the boil, is the KLB. Senator Kerry may not be remembered for anything else but he might command a footnote in history as the unwitting layer of the minefield which brought grief to Pakistani democracy once again. This was a land always dedicated to intrigue and cynicism. Now in its list of dedications must also be included irony.
Does the army have any right to monitor the political horizon? Of course not. Politics and governance are not its province. But since when did a verbal position, or constitutional niceties, stand in the way of 111 Brigade, for much of Pakistan's history its highest judicial forum? The constitution was no bar to Zia's generals when they overthrew an elected government and seized power. It did not stand in the way of Musharraf's generals when they deposed another elected government. Article Six of the constitution, which prescribes the death penalty for subversion of the constitution, will remain a fantasy --a daydream to beguile Pakistani minds --if democracy is not backed and buttressed by superior political performance. If generals could be kept in check by sermons we would all be riding the finest race horses.
Zardari is an elected president --there can be no quarrel with this. But his performance or, more accurately, his inadequacy is hastening the demise of democracy. If he is to survive, and Pakistan's fledgling democracy is not to collapse, some of the political baggage he carries will probably have to be discarded. The clouds on the horizon, if not the gods, are demanding a sacrifice and to appease them some heads may have to roll.
This is not a happy prospect, for after the Feb 2008 elections we had convinced ourselves that democracy was secured and the era of Westridge interventions (where 111 Brigade is stationed) was forever over. The more things change … the more they add to the sum of Pakistani cynicism.
The fresh wave of terrorist attacks --from the audacious assault on GHQ to the coordinated multiple attacks on police centres in Lahore --is adding a further note of grimness to an already dark situation. For these attacks could be cited as justification for wrapping up the civilian order and taking on the Taliban under a 'unified chain of command'. We had a unified chain of command under Musharraf and look where it took us.
Anyway, the horses are out and, to echo Ghalib, there is no hand on the reins and no foot in the stirrups. And even Ghalib had no idea where the galloping steed would come to rest.
Courtesy: The News
by Ayaz Amir
October 16, 2009
Pakistan's American relationship will surely survive the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) but Pakistani democracy --the post Feb 2008 phase of it--may not. One of the stated, indeed touted, aims of this bill is to strengthen democratic institutions. The way it is turning out, the KLB --or rather the manner of its handling by our diplomatic and political wizards --may well be the demolition explosive which brings the house of democracy (our perennial house of cards) down. Think again of the law of unintended consequences.
To be fair to the KLB, it isn't the sole or primary cause of tensions between the Presidency and General Headquarters (GHQ). These tensions predate this controversy and centre on a growing level of mistrust between these two centres of power. But the KLB has brought this mistrust into the open. Pretence has vanished and good manners too are falling by the wayside --if there is any truth to the report that Interior Minister Rehman Malik received a cold shoulder when he went to place a wreath at GHQ (for the dead in the GHQ attack).
Are the knives out completely? Is another night of the long boots at hand? This is pretty melodramatic stuff and we may not be at that stage yet because, with Pakistan engaged so closely with the US in its Taliban wars, it may not quite be the season of unilateral decision-making (also translatable as unilateral adventures). But the signs are ominous and Islamabad's atmosphere is once more heavy with foreboding. The faces of those who matter --or those in the know of such things --are getting noticeably longer.
The Joint Explanatory Statement read out by Senator Kerry with our increasingly quixotic foreign minister in attendance alters nothing. It is merely an explanation of provisions in the bill and, in legal terms, worth less than a statement on a Rs20 stamped paper from the District Courts, Islamabad. Why is the foreign minister so in awe of his American interlocutors? When the KLB was first passed he hailed it as an historic achievement. If only he had checked the temperature in Islamabad he might have saved himself this misplaced bravado. Once again he is pushing his luck by declaring that the Explanatory Statement was "historic". Israel is America's closest ally. No Israeli official behaves like this in Washington.
Of course, if we are looking for a face-saving formula, and provided everyone is on board, including the praetorian element in GHQ, we can paint this as a huge concession--which it is not--and raise a joint toast of acceptance to the KLB. But this wouldn't square with the current mood in GHQ which, if journalist friends in touch with the army are to be believed, is about as dark as ever. The army in one of its super-patriotic moments: it is no laughing matter.
Do I exaggerate? Perhaps. I may have splashed too much colour on the canvas. But this should take away nothing from the fact that things are grim and could get worse if the political class doesn't wake up and arrest the slide. What is GHQ's major grouse against the Presidency? Nothing more damning than the perception that it has a one-on-one relationship with the Americans above and beyond the usual channels of engagement and communication. Singled out on our side as the key players in this relationship are two figures: our man (or suspect, depending on one's taste) in Washington and my friend Herr Rehman Malik in the interior ministry. In the praetorian mind the emotion they arouse the most is suspicion touched with anger.
And why is this out-of-the-loop American connection so worrisome for the guardians more of our ideological than geographical frontiers (for their success in guarding geography has been less than impeccable over the years)? Judging by the buzz emanating from army-savvy media conquistadores, the army high command is worried about two things above all: the CIA's expanding footprint in Pakistan--too many Americans going about business that few people seem to have any clear idea of--and the threat that this may pose to our nuclear programme.
From this it would seem that the army's real objection to the KLB relates not so much to such high-sounding concepts as honour, national dignity and inviolate sovereignty as to the fear that the KLB will provide an enabling environment for the CIA to further expand its presence in Pakistan, thereby posing a greater threat to our nuke arsenal.
The irony couldn't be richer. The world in its more paranoid moments thinks Pakistan's nukes could fall into the hands of the Taliban. The Pakistan army thinks that if there is a threat to our nukes it comes principally from the knights of Langley. At the heart of army angst lies another sliver of suspicion. All previous aid programmes from the US were the property of military regimes: Ayub, Zia, Musharraf. This one is painted for the most part in civilian camouflage and the army doesn't trust the civilians in charge.
Musharraf opened the floodgates to American intrusion and interference. It is only now we are getting to know some of the concessions he gave the Americans, unchecked entry through our airports being one such concession amidst a host of others. The CIA station in Islamabad is amongst the biggest CIA centres in the world. To honour one of its greatest facilitators it should raise a statue to Musharraf in its courtyard. To think that the army endured Musharraf for eight and a half years but its cup of patience vis-à-vis Zardari is spilling over after only a year and a half. Obviously, different standards are at work in GHQ when it comes to evaluating threats to national security: when a military strongman is in the seat of power and when it is democracy's turn to enter the well of death (maut ka koonwan).
And the catalyst of all this, the thing which has brought army suspicions to the boil, is the KLB. Senator Kerry may not be remembered for anything else but he might command a footnote in history as the unwitting layer of the minefield which brought grief to Pakistani democracy once again. This was a land always dedicated to intrigue and cynicism. Now in its list of dedications must also be included irony.
Does the army have any right to monitor the political horizon? Of course not. Politics and governance are not its province. But since when did a verbal position, or constitutional niceties, stand in the way of 111 Brigade, for much of Pakistan's history its highest judicial forum? The constitution was no bar to Zia's generals when they overthrew an elected government and seized power. It did not stand in the way of Musharraf's generals when they deposed another elected government. Article Six of the constitution, which prescribes the death penalty for subversion of the constitution, will remain a fantasy --a daydream to beguile Pakistani minds --if democracy is not backed and buttressed by superior political performance. If generals could be kept in check by sermons we would all be riding the finest race horses.
Zardari is an elected president --there can be no quarrel with this. But his performance or, more accurately, his inadequacy is hastening the demise of democracy. If he is to survive, and Pakistan's fledgling democracy is not to collapse, some of the political baggage he carries will probably have to be discarded. The clouds on the horizon, if not the gods, are demanding a sacrifice and to appease them some heads may have to roll.
This is not a happy prospect, for after the Feb 2008 elections we had convinced ourselves that democracy was secured and the era of Westridge interventions (where 111 Brigade is stationed) was forever over. The more things change … the more they add to the sum of Pakistani cynicism.
The fresh wave of terrorist attacks --from the audacious assault on GHQ to the coordinated multiple attacks on police centres in Lahore --is adding a further note of grimness to an already dark situation. For these attacks could be cited as justification for wrapping up the civilian order and taking on the Taliban under a 'unified chain of command'. We had a unified chain of command under Musharraf and look where it took us.
Anyway, the horses are out and, to echo Ghalib, there is no hand on the reins and no foot in the stirrups. And even Ghalib had no idea where the galloping steed would come to rest.
Courtesy: The News
Kashmir Issue
Kashmir without a soul
By Kuldip Nayar
23 Oct, 2009
IT is unbelievable but Srinagar has changed beyond recognition in the past four years since I was there last. Right from the swanky new airport to the hotel, a distance of about 10 km, there is modern construction.
However, trees have been cut down mercilessly to accommodate fancy thoroughfares. Walls running along the road have been demolished and the rubble is there for all to see. As I covered the journey to my hotel, I missed the old Kashmiri houses from where women with long trinkets would peer out.
Shops are well stocked and full of customers. Too much money is flowing in and the guess is that it is from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India in that order. The number of cars on the road is many times more than before. There are traffic jams and one has to keep the snarls in mind when one plans a trip. People move freely. I saw many women on the road without burka or headwear.
Militancy is by and large over. Some terrorists strike once in a while. They attacked the police at Lal Chowk recently. But I get the feeling that the media magnifies stray incidents. When attacks were a regular feature, there was curfew after sunset. Now the people are on the road even at 11 pm.
I did not see a single policeman on the road from the airport. Bunkers are mostly gone. I found one at Lal Chowk where some policemen stood with their fingers on the trigger. Papa One and Papa Two, the interrogation centres, have been closed. But detentions still take place. The biggest worry is the occasional disappearance of youth. Incidents like the rape of two women at Shopian are rare. But whenever they take place, they infuriate the people to the extent that they come out on the streets.
The mode of search, whether of a vehicle or a person, has changed. Policemen are more polite and less intrusive. Still a member of a very respected family told me how he and his wife were stopped on the road. A policeman wanted to search the woman but on his insistence a female officer did so.
The anti-India feeling is there beneath the surface. People are not afraid of saying so. However, pro-Pakistan sentiments have practically disappeared, more because of the Kashmiris’ perception of the mess in which the country is.
I found the Hurriyat leaders sober. One leader told me that they had vibes from Delhi that something positive would emerge. They are looking forward to talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. There is an effort to have a consensus among the different parties, including the Hurriyat, before the prime minister’s arrival. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah wants New Delhi to talk to all political parties but has also emphasised that India should have a dialogue with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir problem.
It was an interesting talk which I heard when I was sitting with the Hurriyat leaders. A young Pakistani American told them that what had surprised him after the span of three years since his last visit was that Kashmir was “being assimilated by India quickly”. They were embarrassed but did not want to reply to him in my presence.
Born in Kashmir, this young man is a member of a think tank in Washington. He told them that free state elections, watched by a large number of Americans on televisions, had made a great impression. He said they were beginning to believe that the problem was “more or less over”.
Former chief minister Farooq Abdullah is more candid than his son, Omar, who is losing his popularity fast. Farooq says there are “paid lobbies” in the state to keep the problem alive. He accuses security forces, politicians and bureaucrats of having “a vested interest in the Kashmir crisis”. He has a point when he says that New Delhi has failed to make headway in resolving the problem. Not many solutions are hawked about now.
There is a suggestion that both Kashmirs should be demilitarised, India withdrawing its forces from the valley and stationing them on its border and Pakistan doing likewise and pulling out its forces from Azad Kashmir. But this depends on India and Pakistan reaching a settlement, supported by the Kashmiris.
The problem of Jammu and Ladakh has become ticklish. They do not want to stay with the valley. Jammu wants to join India and Ladakh wants a union territory status. True, the Hurriyat has never tried to woo Jammu and has seldom cared for the Kashmiri Pandits languishing there. Still both Jammu and Ladakh can be brought around if they were to be given an autonomous status by the valley within the state.
I have no doubt that the Kashmir problem will be solved sooner or later. But too much has happened in the state in the past. This makes it difficult for the old Kashmir to come back to life. Familiar symbols are dying. Sufism has been replaced by assertive teachings. Kashmiri music is dying out because society has been forced to acquire a religious edge. Old crafts attract fewer artisans because there is a race to earn a quick buck. The wazwan, a string of Kashmiri dishes served at one sitting, is still there but new cooks are hard to get.
The reintegration of Muslims and Pandits appears difficult. An Islamic identity has taken shape, reportedly more in the countryside. Kashmiriyat, a secular ethos, is beyond repair. The animosity among the three regions Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh, may dilute but will remain. It may still remain the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But its soul would be missing.
Courtesy: Dawn
---------------------------------
Any solution for
Dr Tariq Rahman
Resolving the issue and having peace is a matter of prosperity and power for
For
Why are we sitting on this ticking time bomb? Well, because we followed policies which brought us to this pass. Even if we dismiss Maj-Gen Akbar Khan’s account which suggests that the tribesmen who went into Kashmir in 1947 were aided by the employees of the state — if not the politico-legal decision-makers of the state — we still have to account for the follies of 1965, the proxy war with India from 1989 until recently and the Kargil operation of 1999.
It is said that all followed the same strategy: fighters were allegedly facilitated across the LOC in the hope of their sparking a revolt against
One fallout that nobody foresaw was the unleashing of militancy in the name of Islam. The young men who were brainwashed were from families which had been denied food, education and the comforts of life. Above all, they were neglected and insulted and abused. But now they have guns and an ideal, and one they consider sacred, to live for. They are not easy to defeat by the Pakistani state. That is why
The rationalisation of
Pakistani excuses have been just as hollow. If it was a question of the faith of the ruled, the Junagadh ruler’s decision to accede to
In any case, the Muslim League never applied the religion-based principle — nor did the Congress — to the princely states. So let us modify what I said before — nationalists don’t bother about the ruled; all they want is the territory they inhabit. Unfortunately, the common people of
More sophisticated people talk about the water which flows through
If
Courtesy: Dawn
Kashmir -- at a crossroads, again?
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
The news from occupied Kashmir in recent days has been dominated by the political drama of Omar Abdullah's resignation and then resumption of chief ministership amid allegations of his involvement in a scandal. But this farcical row between the state government and opposition does not obscure the reality of renewed unrest in the Valley, which remains the world's most militarized region. Its latest expression has been the popular protests over the Shopian atrocity.
Public anger erupted two months ago over the rape and murder of a pregnant woman and her teenage sister-in-law at the hands of state security forces. Initial denial of this crime and an official cover up intensified the public outrage. Even as the chief minister relented and ordered an inquiry, the protests widened beyond Shopian and spread across Kashmir.
The Shopian rape case was only the latest instance of the violence inflicted by security forces in the past two decades. It was a consequence of the "structural realities of militarization in Kashmir that foster genderised and sexualized violence", according to a brief prepared by an Indian NGO, the International Peoples' Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice.
Unrest over Shopian quickly morphed, as discontent on most issues in Kashmir often does, into strident demands for an end to Indian rule. This prompted The Economist in its June 27 issue to comment: "Sixty two years after India secured the richest portion of Kashmir, its Muslim inhabitants miss no chance to tell it to leave." Demonstrations continued through July over a series of other deaths which implicated the security forces.
Attending an international Kashmir conference last week in Washington against this backdrop, I found one question dominate the two day proceedings. This being: which way is the youth-driven peaceful movement, evidenced in the recent demonstrations as well as in the much bigger protests last year, headed? Organized by that indefatigable champion of the Kashmir cause, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, the conference (attended by participants from the occupied state, India, Pakistan, Azad Kashmir, the US and Britain) posed a set of linked questions. What could happen if the Kashmiri struggle that has increasingly assumed the shape of a nonviolent movement, fails to achieve its objectives; if its grievances are not addressed; if the stalled Pakistan-India dialogue is unable to alleviate the demands of the movement? Will this be a game-changer?
To understand the significance of these questions, it is necessary to place them in the context of what has been happening in Jammu and Kashmir since 2008. This is the year the Indian authorities declared as the most nonviolent since 1989, when the Kashmir uprising began. The militancy, according to Indian officials, had been "crushed". A relative, though surface calm prevailed.
The eruption of protests shattered this illusion of normalcy.2008 witnessed the highest number of anti-India protests in Kashmir's recent history. The catalyst was the controversial government decision to transfer forest land to the trust that administered the Hindu Amarnath shrine. This provoked intense opposition, as Kashmiri Muslims saw parallels between this and Israeli settlement policy, and construed this as a design to alter the state's demographic and religious balance.
This triggered the largest demonstrations Kashmir had seen since the uprising broke out in 1989-1990. The protests snowballed into a people's movement with tens of thousands taking to the streets. When the government rescinded the decision, a blockade of the Valley imposed by Hindu nationalists in Jammu, added fuel to Kashmir's fire. Mass protests swelled to unleash long pent-up tensions.
While there were parallels with the political unrest of 1989, there were also important differences. What distinguished the 2008 upheaval from the past – there were several eyewitness accounts at the Washington conference – was that it was youth-led, remarkably well-organized and self disciplined as well as clear in articulating its demands. The protests of June-August 2008 saw tech-savvy students use the web to spread their message; they blogged their grievances and posted videos on You Tube. The authorities blocked internet access, but this did not dampen the rising wave of mass protest. The demand for "azadi" from Indian rule was articulated by those who had grown up on the memories and experience of 20 years of repression, torture, and the daily humiliation of occupation. "Nobody amongst us saw a childhood", said a young protestor. In a seminal piece in Outlook (1 Sept, 2008), Arundhati Roy wrote: "the young generation discovered the power of mass protest…. and the dignity to speak for themselves" and this became "a plebiscite that was never held".
The Kashmiri leadership was re-empowered by the people and forced to forge a common front. As the leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Mirwaiz Umer Farooq put it at the time: "Purely indigenous, purely Kashmiri, even we were surprised by the force" of the protests.
The mass agitation shook the Indian establishment. Unable to blame Pakistan or the militants, Delhi didn't know how to respond. But respond it did with characteristic heavy handedness: a massive crackdown that left over 40 people dead, including an APHC leader, and hundreds injured. The movement's demands were contained in a memorandum handed in at the local UN office on August 18, 2008. This called for an end to Indian occupation, deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and an investigation into two decades of war crimes by India's security forces.
This was no passing episode as the renewal of protests in 2009 testified. It marked a new phase in the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination: using peaceful means of mass protests to press their case. At the conference it was not just Kashmiris from the Valley who stressed this point, but several Indian participants who also said that the mass rallies belied the official claim that elections had settled the issue. All of this raised the all-important question: if peaceful protests fail, what then?
An Indian delegate, Gautam Navlakha, from the Economic and Political Weekly, put it starkly. "If this peaceful movement does not find a democratic solution, the young will pick up the gun". He warned of radicalization on an unprecedented scale if Kashmiri aspirations are not addressed. This echoed what Mirwaiz had declared at the height of last year's upsurge: "The young will be forced to take up arms."
As for the likely response from Delhi, Mr Navlakha made the following comment: "For two decades well-intentioned Indians used to say that if the Kashmiris abandoned armed struggle, the Indian government would respond to their demands. But this has turned out to be a lie".
Other Indian participants concurred. Harinder Baweja, a journalist from Tehelka, spoke of India's enduringly obdurate stance of "containing" and "managing", rather than addressing the roots of Kashmiri alienation. An American academic, Dr Richard Shapiro injected into the debate his observation that Delhi uses the terrorism issue to "legitimate its repression of the Kashmiri people: traitors and terrorists become the template for the disproportionate violence unleashed in Kashmir".
The warnings voiced at the conference about the danger of radicalization suggests that the crisis has come full circle in Kashmir. Between 1987-89, a wave of peaceful protests swept the Valley, sparked initially by a rigged election. This was followed by the Gawkadal massacre in January 1990, when unprovoked firing by security forces on unarmed demonstrators, including women and children, in Srinagar left a record number of people dead. This became a defining moment in Kashmir's tortuous history and contributed to the conditions that led to armed resistance.
Kashmir may once again be at a critical turning point. What happens next can have grave implications for the region and beyond. Despite the potential ramifications for US policy in the region, it is astonishing that no American official came to the conference to learn about current dynamics in the world's most dangerous flash point, and listen to the grim prognosis from a diverse array of speakers.
The international community ignores the Kashmir powder keg at its peril. With Pakistan-India relations back to the default setting of 'no war, no peace, and no solutions to disputes', this does not hold out any promise of addressing Kashmiri aspirations and alleviating their plight. Tensions between the nuclear neighbours can easily be re-ignited by turmoil in the Valley. Paralysis in peace making and international apathy only heightens the danger in a volatile region that is poised at a tipping point.
Aug04,2009
Courtesy: The News
Monday, October 12, 2009
Kerry-Lugar Bill
The Kerry-Lugar fiasco
Shamshad Ahmad
October 19, 2009
The Kerry-Lugar Bill was supposed to bring a “larger conceptual framework” and mutuality content to the “transactional” US-Pakistan relationship. It has done just the opposite. There has been a serious backlash in Pakistan over the intrusive conditionalities attached to US military aid which are seen by the people at large and major civil and military stakeholders in the country’s power structure as compromising national sovereignty.
The bill does no good to the US-Pakistan relationship which already has had a troubled history. Its original author, Joe Biden, while running for president in November 2007, had envisioned a new policy for Pakistan advocating the need for new dynamics in the US-Pakistan relationship with greater mutuality content and people-centred socio-economic development. His strategy envisaged moving from an issue-specific relationship to a normal, functional relationship with Pakistan.
Last year in July, Senator Joe Biden presented a bipartisan bill in the Senate involving an annual aid package of $1.5 billion for five years renewable for another five years, with an additional $1 billion as “democracy dividend,” and an appropriate “performance-based” military assistance which was to be subjected to rigorous oversight and accountability. It was a well-meaning initiative designed to strengthen democracy in Pakistan.
After the US presidential election last year, the Biden-Lugar bill became the Kerry-Lugar Bill with several changes in its content and wording. The provision on non-security assistance remained the same but the idea of a democracy dividend disappeared. Obviously the democratic credentials of the post-Musharraf NRO-based government in Islamabad were known to the US Congress. Under Section 203, some badly worded certification conditionalities were attached to the provision for military assistance to Pakistan.
There is nothing unusual with aid-related conditionalities. In fact, the very concept of foreign aid is predicated on mutually convergent obligations of donor and recipient countries inherent in their political, economic, military, moral, social and now strategic priorities. Even the famous Marshall Plan had its conditionalities to ensure the requisite oversight and accountability. But even in term of conditionalities, the donor and recipient always do lot of homework to evolve the needed convergence of mutual obligations.
In this particular case, it seems, no such homework was done. The bill became a crisis for both the PPP government and US policy makers. It was a classic example of flawed decision-making on both sides. On the Pakistani side, it was a matter of poor judgment of its own national mood and country’s vital interests. The major civilian and military stakeholders in the country, including the parliament, opposition and the army were either kept in the dark or were misinformed about the contents of the bill.
On the American side, it was yet another blatant example of closing their eyes to history, playing games with Pakistan’s weak and crumbling democracy, exploiting its vulnerable leadership, and extremely poor public diplomacy in the face of growing anti-Americanism. Joe Biden’s realistic approach for a new policy towards Pakistan was woefully distorted and once again circumscribed to Washington’s narrowly based and vaguely defined issue-specific priorities.
The major problem with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, now formally known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, is in its provisions on security-related assistance involving pre-disbursement certifications by the US Secretary of State. The first and perhaps the most ominously sensitive certification clause is the one warranting Pakistan’s continued cooperation “on the dismantling of nuclear weapon-related supplier networks and providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.”
The other certification pertained to Pakistan’s commitment to “combating terrorist groups, ceasing support, including by any elements within Pakistan military or its intelligence agency to extremists and terrorist groups, preventing Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups from operating in its territory or launching cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries and dismantling of terrorist operation bases on its soil including Quetta and Muridke.” Ironically, Pakistan is already doing all these things and daily paying a heavy price.
Perhaps the most incredulous certification requirement is the one to assure the Congress that Pakistan’s “security forces are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of the country.” This is a joke of the highest order and perhaps an opportunity for agonising soul-searching in Washington to find who has really been “subverting the constitutional, political or judicial processes” in this benighted country.
Ironically, Section 302 (the murderous section 302 in Pakistan’s legal parlance) on semi-annual “monitoring reports” also calls for “an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight, and approval of military budgets, chain of command, process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.”
This assessment, if carried out objectively, would eventually be an indictment of our civilian leadership itself for lacking the “credibility and competence” in exercising the purported “civilian control” over the military and for ineffective and poor “strategic guidance and planning.” The assessment will hopefully not omit the extent to which our elected rulers and entities are observing the sanctity of constitutional supremacy and upholding political or judicial processes in the country.
Unfortunately, in our political realm, it happens to be our current civilian leadership which is now flouting democratic norms by holding on to a dictator’s legacy, the notorious the Seventeenth Amendment. The military after Musharraf’s ouster is playing by the rules. We now have an independent judiciary. If the civilian leadership remains truthful to the Constitution, the military will have no excuse to come back. The final onus thus now rests with our civilian rulers and representatives.
The very first instance of the commitment of our rulers to democratic norms is the contempt shown to the parliament on the question of building a “national response” to the issues of our legitimate concern in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Foreign Minister Qureshi rushed post-haste to Washington without taking the parliament into confidence and reached an understanding based on a clarification from the co-authors of the bill, which has no legal status or effect.
All this notwithstanding, the amount involved in this aid package is not really big money. We can do without it. A little more efficient management of our government can easily save us twice this amount in reduced government spending and giving up of the Marco Polo culture by our leaders. The best thing would have been to thank the US for its generosity and concern for Pakistan’s democracy and development, and tell them that our people are not ready to accept any conditional aid.
Instead of giving our country as ransom, we should be fixing the fundamentals of our governance and choosing to live our own lives as an independent and self-reliant nation, free from want and ignorance and raising our children with honour and dignity, free from the fear of violence, oppression and injustice. Let us focus on domestic resource mobilization and reduce government spending. We are a food-growing country. Let’s grow food for our own people. Give up the Marco Polo culture. No more blind faith in the friends of Pakistan – let us be our own friends.
This warrants us to come out of the denial mode and agree that like India, we can also be self-reliant. Yes, we can do it, remember? After all, Obama in his inaugural address, speaking of the daunting challenges to his administration, had also said: “Yes, we can do it.”
Courtesy: The News
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Sovereignty or self-perpetuation?
Fayyaz Ali Khan
October 15, 2009
Amazingly, the people of Pakistan are being convinced to reject a US financial assistance bill which, for the first time in our history intends to help the people and bar the government from diverting these funds to the military, which many view as being the main hindrance to democracy in the country.
Why do we call it dictation when the bill bars the government from diverting these funds to the military? Isn't it a fact that so far whatever foreign aid has been given to Pakistan, most of it has been consumed by the military establishment? Is it not a fact that the sons of all the previous dictators, who all belonged to the middle or lower middle classes of our society, are today some of the richest in this country? I think we have "eaten enough grass" and the time has come to inject some nutrients in to the drained veins of the hapless masses.
Why is it being portrayed as meddling in our internal affairs when the bill, under the heading, purpose of assistance, says, "to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government"? Or when it states, under limitations on certain assistance, "the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes in Pakistan"? Is it not what our Constitution says? Or are we forgetting Chaudhry Shujaat's famous utterances that it takes only one jeep and a truck to bring about regime change in this country?
Why are we raising a ruckus over the Americans asking us not to get involved in nuclear proliferation or to stop supporting networks involved in proliferation activities given that it has been proven that certain Pakistani individuals were indeed involved in such activities? Also, what is so wrong with the certification requirement in the bill that the government of Pakistan prevent Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, from operating within the territory of Pakistan? That this also include the prevention of cross-border attacks in to neighbouring countries, the closure of terrorist training camps in FATA, and the dismantling of terrorism infrastructure in other parts of the country? If we oppose the bill what signal are sending to the rest of the world? That we are involved in nuclear proliferation and are abetting terrorism overseas?
In fact it would be fair to say that most of the anti-KL bill critics are advocating the adoption of a position that runs counter to our national interest. Also, it would be equally fair to assume that most of the critics will not have read the bill in its entirety and are also unaware of the fact that the certification clauses included in it are usual for most aid bills that the US legislature passes.
Since we say that we are responsible nation and not involved in proliferation activities or that we provide help to terrorist groups operating from our soil to carry out attacks in other countries, there should be little reason for us to oppose Kerry-Lugar. Besides, let us not forget that during the Afghan war, in return for US funding, we were supposed to cap our nuclear programme and that the US president then too was required to certify every year that this was being done. And despite that we managed to develop our nuclear deterrence.
We are projecting ourselves as a nation whose policies, instead of interests, are governed by emotions. Also, in this emotional frenzy, we fail to see that for a change – and this is perhaps a first – the aid that we receive will not go towards purchasing tanks or warplanes but towards addressing poverty, towards building schools, hospitals, improving access to clean drinking water, and on socio-economic development in general.
It is good to see parliament and the civil society debate and discuss our relationship with the US vis-à-vis the conditions attached to Kerry-Lugar. Having said that, it needs to be pointed out that the majority of criticism of the bill is coming from quarters who are known to be supporters, beneficiaries and perpetuators of the rule of the men in khaki. Since the birth of our country, our sovereignty has been time and again breached from within and not outside. I wish the Americans had translated the bill into Urdu and other regional languages so that the people could read it for themselves and see that for a change we are getting foreign aid with strings whose objective seems to be to foster socio-economic development.
The writer is a development consultant based in Peshawar. Email: fayyazalikhan@ yahoo.com
Courtesy: The News
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Transformation?
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
February 6, 2009: Senator Kerry, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "In my conversations with Admiral Mullen… there is a sense of some transformation -- of a willingness to engage in some transformation. I also find that both General Pasha and General Kayani are likewise committed."
April 17: Within 71 days of Kerry's statement, Friends of Democratic Pakistan, upon US prodding, pledged $5.28 billion.
June 11: Within 125 days of Kerry's statement, the US House of Representatives passed The Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act authorising $1.5 billion per fiscal year for non-military assistance to Pakistan plus $300 million for FY2010 and such funds as may be necessary for 'Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund' plus $300 million in Foreign Military Financing.
June 24: With 138 days of Kerry's statement, the US Senate passed The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act authorising $1.5 billion per fiscal year for non-military assistance to Pakistan.
June 2009: Congressional conferees authorised $1 billion for coalition support fund reimbursements (Pakistan receives around 80 per cent of the total) plus $896 million for embassy expansion plus $539 million in Economic Support Funds.
July 24: Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online's bureau chief in Islamabad, one of Pakistan's most perceptive journalists, wrote: "The seamless friendship between… Admiral Mullen and General Kayani has cemented the relationship between the military establishments of the two countries to levels not seen since the 1950s… The result is that Islamabad and Washington are in a position to implement coordinated, long-term policies in the region, which include action against militants, moves to improve ties between Pakistan and India, especially their dispute over divided Kashmir…"
July 30: Syed Saleem Shahzad wrote: "Intense US efforts and assurances have put Pakistan and India on track to renew their dialogue process over key contentious issues, such as divided Kashmir. An important upshot of this is that Islamabad has begun a crackdown on jihadi assets…"
August 5: Within 169 days of Kerry's statement and within 45 days of Saleem Shahzad's article, a US unmanned aerial vehicle fired two air-to-surface Hellfire missiles that killed Baitullah.
August 7: Within 171 days of Kerry's statement, the IMF increased its financial support to $11.3 billion.
August 10: Within 10 days of Saleem Shahzad's article, India's Ministry of Home Affairs began withdrawing four battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force from the border.
August 12: Within 180 days of Kerry's statement, the Ministry of Defence told The News that "32 officers have been retired and others will be fired within the next few months in government efforts to streamline the ISI."
August 18: Lieutenant-General Nadeem told Reuters, "The Pakistan army was short of equipment…" The same day, Holbrooke assured that the US shall "expedite delivery of equipment requested by the Pakistani army."
For the record, within days of Kerry's February 6 statement, US drones shifted focus to the anti-Pakistan Taliban in South Waziristan. Since February 6, with an average of one strike a week, South Waziristan has been hit 23 times; areas controlled by Baitullah have been hit 15 times. For the record, Mian Habib-ur-Rehman of Harkat died in police custody and Shah Abdul Aziz of Jaish was sent to Adiala. Qari Saifullah was arrested on August 17 and Maulvi Omar the following day.
Our strategic thinkers have long considered home-grown terrorists as tourists with guns. Are they now shifting their sail with the wind? Or, are they actually turning on their jihadi assets? Kerry seems convinced that a 'transformation' is underway. And, Kerry may only be older than I am by a day but he is wiser than I am by a year.
Aug 23,2009
Courtesy: The News
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The Kerry-Lugar debate
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Zafar Hilaly
Imagine the Americans, of all people, destabilising Pakistan; which is what Congress has done by acting petulantly and adding intrusive, unenforceable and gratuitously offensive conditions to Kerry-Lugar. Why? Because their favourite dictator played fast and loose with the money gifted to him by Bush, leaving America $13 billion poorer with nothing to show for it. The conditions are in place also because the Congress, reluctant to blame the poor performance of the military in Afghanistan, needs a scapegoat; someone to vent their anger on, to explain why Osama is still free, why Hikmatyar and Haqqani are gathering recruits, why Karzai, their hand-picked overlord of Afghanistan turned is a brazen vote thief and why Americans continue to die in Afghanistan in increasing numbers.
But tempting as it was to blame and humiliate Pakistan, viewed by many in the Congress as a reluctant, inefficient, fickle even duplicitous ally, the latter should have resisted the temptation – simply because alienating Pakistan is a self-defeating exercise which would prove as disastrous for America as much as for the stability and security of the region as a whole. Sadly, an irate Congress, goaded by the many lobbies that have a claim on the voting preferences of Congressmen and, one suspects, some inexplicably poor handling by appointees of the Zardari government, coalesced to produce a mega public relations disaster.
Kerry Lugar may have been drafted to ensure that America's money, all of $1.5 million annually (amounting to nine hours worth of expenditure that is incurred by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan) will not be lost but in the process America has jeopardised something worth much more, and that is not only the little remaining goodwill that existed for her in Pakistan, but, more importantly, the prospects of their staunch ally, Mr Zardari. Eventually, the harm done to the notion that democracy is the best form of government for Pakistan may prove to be the most damaging outcome inflicted by the Congress. In fact, Mark Twain once wrote about the members of the Congress: "Reader, suppose you were an idiot; and suppose you were a member of Congress; but I repeat myself."
That is not to say that the Zardari government, which was badly let down by whoever are its advisers, will fall. It will not, hopefully. But the little recovery that Mr Zardari's standing seemed to be making in the polls, from the depths to which public regard for him had plunged, after his disastrous volte face on the restoration of the CJ, has evaporated. Time, if it ever was, is no longer on the side of Mr Zardari.
Notwithstanding the provocation, in the debate outside the National Assembly unfortunately, not for the first time, instinct and emotion has prevailed over common sense and considered judgement. Patriotism in Pakistan is not only the last resort of the scoundrel but the first bolt hole of the hypocrite. Of course, when the TV anchors took over the story the facts too became extinct.
Actually, there are only two conditions in the Kerry-Lugar Bill that are glaringly offensive; the others do not deserve the hysterical attention they received. In brief, Kerry Lugar offers Pakistan much needed assistance in the civil and military sphere over an extended period of time, in the hope that, in return, Pakistan will abide by her own laws regarding non-proliferation, forbidding the use of her territory by extremists, dismantling of such terror groups that remain and that all political players on the national scene abide by Pakistan's own constitution which forbids military takeovers and vests all authority, including matters concerning the nations defence, in the hands of a elected civilian government. However, the clause relating to the appointments and promotions in the military are fatuous and anyway impossible to monitor.
Besides, Pakistan is not bound by the conditions laid down by Congress nor by accepting the money is Pakistan accepting the conditionalities. That is merely Congress informing the administration of what it desires and what the latter should be looking out for when submitting its periodic report to Congress on the security related portion of the bill. Lest the administration still feels constrained and it is in the national interest of the US, Congress has allowed the President a free hand to waive all the conditions. Of one thing we can be sure, it will never be in the national interest of the United States to shun Pakistan's effective cooperation in the battle against terrorism.
Actually, what is most surprising about Kerry-Lugar is the gullibility of Congress. Imagine believing that when it comes to the crunch Pakistan will not act in her own interest just because Congress will be upset, or because a mere billion dollars (two to three per cent of the annual national budget) will not be available.
When has Pakistan not acted in accordance with her own wishes? Pakistan befriended China (1960) even though America had branded China as an international leper; Pakistan went to war with India twice (1965 and 1971) without caring what America might think, feel or do; Kissinger's threat (1975) that America would make a "horrible example" of Pakistan was brushed off as just so much hot air as Pakistan proceeded apace with her nuclear weapon programme; Pakistan exploded a nuclear device (1998) despite the repeated entreaties of an American President; Pakistan's nuclear scientists stole (and sadly sold) nuclear secrets notwithstanding American strictures to the contrary; even Musharraf, the supine Commando, took the money offered by Bush (2001-2008) thumbed his nose at the US and did with it what he wished; he even thought nothing of starting a war with India (1999) by capturing their defences in Kargil; earlier Pakistan said no to America's request to despatch forces to Vietnam (1970) and subsequently Iraq (2003).
The list of instances where we did, and do, what suits us is long. Like America, we too have always chosen to be faithful to America in our own way. Why then suddenly do our super patriots believe we will act differently after Kerry-Lugar?
Of course there are defects in the bill. It is a crassly crude method of taking to task the democratic dispensation that exists today for the follies of several dictators whom they supported and propped up. Besides, the Americans cannot draw up an indictment against a whole people or insult them merely to register their sense of hurt at the manner their money or interests had been handled by an earlier discredited coterie. For the Americans to shout "thief" today and start taking precautions when they were aware of the robbery years ago and chose to do nothing is knavish not merely foolish.
Nevertheless, we cannot let sentiment override national interest. America's support is important for a host of reasons and especially so when terrorists bent on taking over Pakistan have to be thwarted. There will be time enough, once this threat is eliminated, for point scoring and recrimination. Neither America nor Pakistan can afford to wreck cooperation forged over a difficult decade just to indulge their pique, or an irate Congress, that seems to have lost its marbles. A way out has to be found and lessons learnt.
Courtesy: The News
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Winning hearts, avoiding waste
Monday, October 12, 2009
Abid Hasan
Finally the much awaited Kerry-Lugar Bill has been approved by the US Congress. And what was being heralded as a new chapter in the bumpy Pakistan-US relationship has, unfortunately, started off on an awful note. Instead of the US getting kudos for providing Pakistan with billions of dollars at a time when the former is going through its worst economic crisis, the US is being vilified in an environment which was anti-American to begin with. So what should it do now?
First, it must do quick damage control with regard to the conditionalities related to security assistance, which are seen by most — other than the government – as intrusive and insulting to a sovereign state. Even if the detractors are wrong, it is not the reality but the perception that is driving this sentiment and widening the trust deficit. Surely, it is not in the interest of the US to start a new relationship on a sour note. The vast majority of Pakistanis fully subscribe to the letter and spirit of the conditionalities, and they expect their parliament and government to implement these. Rather than imposing these as conditions, it would be better to include them in the preamble of the bill as stated policy of the Pakistan Government and as expectations of the US from us.
Second, the bill should include, in the preamble, broad principles and specific actions with respect to good governance including (i) establishing a strong and independent anti-corruption institution; (ii) strong and independent Election Commission; (iii) effective laws and mechanisms to minimise abuse of office by holders of public office, especially parliamentarians, ministers, judges and senior civil and military officials. An important element of this would be independent audit of tax and wealth returns filed by these public office holders; (iv) effective transparency and oversight of public procurement. Although the inclusion of such clauses in the bill would make the political and civil/military elite nervous, these are absolutely critical for sustaining democracy and development and for effective use of Pakistani ( and US ) taxpayers’ money. US’s seeming indifference to quality of governance and corruption will be perceived as badly by ordinary folks as the perception that US supports military rule.
Third, the US needs to make sure that the billions of dollars that it spends do make a difference in the lives of millions of ordinary people. Here, the US must incorporate the following two key lessons of development history while finalising the use of its funds: (i) aid only improves public services for the poor when good governance is in place in the recipient country. The US must recognise that bad governance leads to bad results and big money attracts big crooks; (ii) aid needs to be strategic and selective. If it tries to fix all public services, the managerial and financial resources will be spread too thin and will not have any discernable impact.
The government is urging USAID to channel its funds through government institutions, not because of the conviction that this will lead to improvements in social and human development indictors, but because it wants to have its hands and feet in the money bag. Where the quality of governance is good, using government institutions would be the right thing to do. However, in Pakistan’s context, using government institutions runs the high risk of aid being wasted and pocketed. The example of billions of aid dollars poured into the Social Action Programme during the 90s should be an eye opener for the USAID. For the most part, all Pakistan was left with after 10 years was thousands of ghost schools, ghost BHUs, and ghost teachers and health workers, and little, if any, improvement in the social indicators. USAID will contribute to the graveyard of good intentions if it falls into the trap of using government institutions under the present circumstances, eerily resembling the 90s. USAID should leave the fixing of dysfunctional government institutions to the government itself – donors simply cannot fix the deep-seated poor governance and policies.
Moreover, the amount — $1.5 billion — while significant, is no more than 15 per cent of the annual government expenditures in the long list of activities included in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Hence, if USAID is allocated to all these activities, funds will be spread thin and unlikely to have any noticeable impact so it is important to be strategic, selective and hard-nosed in the allocation of aid funds.
Taking into account the lessons of development history and governance realities on the ground, the following could be key elements of a strategic and selective strategy to effectively use billions of dollars and win the hearts and minds of millions of ordinary Pakistanis.
In case of education, allocation of $3-4 billion would be required for the following activities; (i) a stipend programme for all middle/secondary school girls in government schools and low-fee well governed private schools, with the stipend varying by district and grade — higher for girls in districts with low enrollment, and lower for lower grades. Such a nation-wide programme, which has been successfully implemented in Bangladesh and many developing countries, could increase the girls’ enrollment, provide an incentive to poor families to keep girls in school all the way through secondary school and increase the incomes of poor families; (ii) a new high quality secondary school, one each for boys and girls in each tehsil and a high quality university (like LUMS) in each district where only students from government schools would be allowed to enroll. Each school and university would be an independent legal entity, governed by a board comprising civil society leaders, nazim and EDO Education; (iii) an endowment fund to fully fund the operational costs of the above schools and universities for 25-30 years after which they would be handed over to government or local philanthropists.
In case of health, a similar allocation of $3-4 billion would be required to establish; (i) a well functioning health system comprising first level/emergency care facility in each tehsil and a modern hospital in each district. Each of these facilities would be independent entities with their own boards and have features; (ii) an endowment fund to fully fund the operational costs of these facilities for 25-30 years, after which they would be handed over to government or local philanthropists.
Operating in the business-as-usual mode will be a sure kiss of waste. The US will neither achieve the human development goals, nor its goals to establish a new chapter in its relationship with the government and people of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan may be perceived as corrupt and wasteful when US taxpayers see limited impact on the ground in 10 years. Clearly, the proposed way of spending USAID funds would not make government functionaries of the day very happy for it would rob them of the opportunity to siphon off aid as all previous governments have done. A programme along the above lines would ensure effective use of USAID funds and would benefit millions of ordinary Pakistanis. It would also dot the Pakistani landscape with thousands of visible “islands of excellence for the poor”, continuously reminding the people of US’s contributions to our country for nation building.
Courtesy: The News
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Pakistan Gets Billions, But What About Scrutiny?
By:Saad Khan
The Pakistani government must be happy now as they are able to get billions of dollars in aid both from the United States and the international community of donors.The US Senate approved the Kerry Lugar bill that will allow the disbursement of $7.5 billion dollars in civilian aid over the course of five years.The aid roughly translates to $1.5 billion a year.The Zardari government as expected has welcomed this aid though they are not satisfied with just $7.5 billion they want billions more and are expecting another aid package from the US.Additionally they are also looking to their 'friends' in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) a group created in September 2008 to help the nascent Pakistani democratic government to tackle extremist elements.President Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown participated in a recent meeting of the group on September 24th.Zardari was also in attendance.
The Brown government has pledged 50 million Pounds in assistance to Pakistan.Other members of the group have also pledged some help in this regard.Major donors to the FoDP include the US UK Saudi Arabia Turkey UAE Japan and the Asian Development Bank.They initially pledged $5.1 billion in aid during a conference in Tokyo and the recent pledges represent a reassurance from the donors that they are eager to bring Pakistan out of its financial crisis.But do they need to do this while their own economies are badly suffering? This is a valid question being asked by Americans as their country is donating the largest chunk of money to Pakistan.Critics also cite the incompetent governance and widespread corruption in Pakistan which includes charges of financial embezzlement against Zardari (he was known as Mr.10% for requesting that amount as a commission on every deal).Nawaz Sharif another popular leader of Pakistan and now the main opposition leader was also accused of corruption during his two time premiership.
A recent report by Transparency International has raised serious questions about the competency of the Pakistani government.While financial embezzlement is not a new thing in Pakistan and the Pakistani government would be ready to enjoy the great 'financial feast' offered by the US American taxpayers might not be ready to accept this deal.Although there is news about tight scrutiny of the aid package the US government needs to ensure that the aid goes to the right people and not to the corrupt government agencies or fake non governmental organizations.The case of Pakistan is a complex one and needs international attention.If the US wants to gain a positive feeling among common Pakistanis it has to ensure direct aid to the masses instead of spending taxpayer money on corrupt government agencies.The importance of scrutiny and accountability has increased further as donor countries are facing deep recessions.The aid is good but needs to be spent thoughtfully on the right organizations.Only then can the US government achieve some of its strategic goals in the region.
Courtesy: huffingtonpost
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Kerry-Lugar
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
Democrat Barack Obama was elected president of the US by 69,456,897 American voters. Democrat John Kerry was elected US senator from Massachusetts. Republican Richard Lugar was elected US senator from Indiana. Obama swore to "faithfully execute the Office of the President of the US" and to the best of his ability "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the US". Senators Kerry and Lugar swore that they would "support and defend the Constitution of the US against all enemies, foreign and domestic…" The president receives $193,400 per year to "faithfully execute the Office of the President of the US" and each senator gets an annual salary of $174,000 for defending the "Constitution of the US against all enemies, foreign and domestic…"
Make no mistake, the Kerry-Lugar Bill is to safeguard and protect the interests of the US. The authors of the bill along with each and every mover of the bill is under legal obligation to 'preserve, protect and defend' the interests of the Untied States. Lo and behold! Pak-US interests can converge.
Q1. What are the conditionalities? Answer: No "security-related assistance may be provided… until the secretary of state… makes the certification (sec 203)." Amazingly, $750 million per year worth of non-security-related assistance has no condition and the condition for the other $750 million per year is that the president's special representative shall certify that Pakistan is making "reasonable progress" as per the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report. Q2. Does Kerry-Lugar compromise Pakistan's sovereignty? Answer: Kerry-Lugar was passed in late-September. Pakistan's sovereignty was compromised on June 13, 2009, when our minister of state for finance declared Pakistan's resources to be Rs1.78 trillion while expenditures were estimated at Rs2.46 trillion. The very day that our National Assembly admitted that we would be soliciting charity to fill the Rs700 billion deficit our sovereignty was compromised. Pakistan's sovereignty was compromised further on July 27 when our minister for commerce announcing Pakistan's trade policy had set our export target at $18.8 billion (our import bill for 2007-08 was $35.4 billion). The very day that our very own minister declared that we would be asking for alms to fill the $16.6 billion trade deficit our sovereignty was compromised.
Q3: What does Kerry-Lugar say about Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad? Answer: The government of Pakistan should make progress on "preventing Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad from operating in the territory of Pakistan…" For the record, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad were both banned by the government of Pakistan in 2002. Q4: What does Kerry-Lugar say about our nuclear infrastructure? Answer: Three things: one, Pakistan shall "prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise". Two, that US assistance should not be directed to the expansion of nuclear stockpile. Three, Pakistan shall "dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials." We should not have any problem with the first two; it is really not in our interest to be the source of proliferation and the donor certainly has the right to impose restrictions on where his money cannot be spent. Yes, number three could be problematic as we are in an arms race with India.
Q5: What does Kerry-Lugar say about India? Answer: "It is critical to Pakistan's long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan". Q6: What does Kerry-Lugar say about Quetta and Muridke? Answer: The government of Pakistan shall make progress in "dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke…"
On the brighter side of things, beggars can never be bankrupts and beggars shall fear no rebellion.
04 Oct 2009
Courtesy: The News
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Kerry-Lugar — a bitter pill
Monday, October 12, 2009
Malik Amin Aslam
Over the years, Pakistan’s relationship with the US has been anything but stable. It has wildly oscillated from an awkward mutual dependence and inescapable reliance to being hindered with mistrust. Right from inception, it has been a continuous roller coaster ride which has witnessed endearing periods of the Afghan War, the current war against terrorism leading to Pakistan’s acceptance as a non-NATO ally in 2004 and the much acclaimed US disaster relief efforts during the 2005 earthquake. At the same time, it has endured the much ostracised, US indifference in the 1971 war with India, the Carter Aid suspension in 1979, biting Pressler Amendments in 1985, sudden Bush aid suspension in 1990, unfulfilled F-16s delivery and the biased Indian nuclear deal of 2007.
In this fluctuating backdrop, the Kerry-Lugar Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009 was formulated to stabilise and alter this transactional relationship. The genesis and subsequent shaping of the bill makes for a very interesting analysis.
Without a doubt, the chief architect and leading advocate of this long-term engagement with Pakistan is Joe Biden, the current US Vice-President and former head of the Senate foreign relations committee. In the US, he has long been recognised as one of the leading experts on Pakistan and it did not come as a surprise when he articulated a fresh and new approach to Pakistan in a defining speech at the Centre for US Global Engagement in 2007. This was heralded as a well-intentioned call to alter the US-Pakistan association. The intended shift was premised on four pillars: the tripling of Non-security aid to $1.5 billion/annum while ensuring that it is untied and unconditional; linking all security aid to Pakistan upon certain calibrated performance benchmarks; awarding a democracy dividend of $1 billion to Pakistan; and focusing on a renewed and sustained engagement with the country.
The approach explicitly mentioned the need to sensitise US policy to the issues of Kashmir and Palestine and of revisiting matters such as the US visa policy for Pakistan. Moreover, as a support to Pakistan’s stability, it called for the redoubling of war efforts in Afghanistan including the institution of a Marshall plan for the country’s future development needs. This well thought out approach was formalised as the Biden-Lugar Bill and aimed to secure US interests in this region by forging a lasting relationship with Pakistan. It was to leverage democratic and economic stability for this front-line ally of the US. On its part, economically burdened and dreadfully fatigued by the on-going war, Pakistan hoped for recognition for its war effort and a bail-out from some of the associated challenges.
However, the noble intentions with which the associated bill started its journey expediently went astray somewhere along the approval process. The current version of the bill whose approval was proudly owned up to and announced by Obama in New York marks a significant and almost seismic shift from the Biden philosophy.
To start with the bill, which now stands approved by both houses, reads like a charge sheet accusing Pakistan of all the “wrongs” in the on-going war. The proposed democratic dividend has been stripped off the bill along with any mention of the Kashmir issue. The intended unconditional non-security aid of $1.5 billion is now strapped and burdened with all sorts of provisos ranging from “dismantling and defeating” Al Qaeda, eliminating “safe havens” and facilitating and ensuring non-proliferation – all of which sound good to the ear but are conditions almost impossible to meet. Considering the fact that the US and mighty NATO alliance has failed to live up to the above conditions in Afghanistan, it can be easily deduced that Pakistan is inevitably destined to fall short of the unreasonable expectations.
To add insult to our collective intelligence, the thinly veiled references to preventing attacks in neighbouring countries (read India) and giving interrogation access to individuals accused of proliferation (read A Q Khan) have been included. Moreover, the democratic safety provisions which on the face of it ensure that US, unlike the past, will favour dealing with civilian governments are all linked to exit waivers which can be conveniently invoked citing US security interests. Finally, the so-called partnership package now seems more like a carte blanche license for imperialistic interventions and intrusive meddling.
The final shape of the bill may now be a fait accompli. The route and ominous direction of its transformation points first and foremost towards a failure of our foreign policy gurus or the expensive lobbyists engaged in the US who allowed a move of stated good intentions to transform into a bill of national humiliation. Secondly, it seems that the earlier stated intentions of the Biden doctrine were just that – stated and not actual intentions. His recent philosophical shift from advocating a redoubling of efforts in Afghanistan to now asking for a renewed war focus on Pakistan and the associated announcement through US officials of the sudden birth of the Quetta Shura gives dangerous credence to the theory of shifting the theater of war into Pakistan.
As is evident from the national debate following the announcement of the bill, there is divided opinion. An elitist minority feels that our already announced budgetary and trade deficits pre-ordained our status as beggars who obviously can’t be choosers and have to live with this humiliation. The majority of the populace, however, dreams of a different Pakistan. A Pakistan where budget deficits are treated not through the begging bowl but by digging deeper into its own resources and strapping the extravagance of its leaders. A nuclear Pakistan which can restore its pride and dignity and assert its geo-political situation to its advantage. A Pakistan which needs to “rethink” its role in an endless war which has drained its economy of $36 billion is now at the verge of enslaving it for a paltry $1.5 billion. This populace is beginning to aggressively question. Is the national humiliation worth the Lugar pill?
Pakistan’s previous relationship with the US abruptly ended in the 90s after the quick and unceremonious exit of the US from Afghanistan. At that time, Pakistan felt abandoned and betrayed like a used tissue. This present romance, unfortunately, seems to be headed towards another ignoble future battered by an endless war and aided by the degrading bill designed to jeopardise any sustained longevity of this relationship.
Courtesy: The News
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Kerry-Lugar trap
By Iqbal Jafar
Monday, 12 Oct, 2009
THE Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar bill, is a good example of bureaucratic legalese where the intended meaning may not be clear, nor intended to be clear, and what may be clear, may not be intended.
For starters, the reader may, by way of an experiment in semantics, substitute the words ‘control of’ for the words ‘partnership with’ in the title of the bill, and then read the text again. Suddenly, the text would become simple and clear like a nursery rhyme, though not as funny. At this point we can begin to explore the hidden implications of the provisions of the bill.
First, what is more important is not whether the amount of assistance is too meagre or the conditionalities too many, but the assumptions behind specific matters of concern enumerated in subsection (c) of section 203. The secretary of state has to certify progress on these matters (six in number) every year.
The assumptions that could justify the need for yearly certification are: “supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials” have not yet been dismantled; the Government of Pakistan including “elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agencies” have yet to cease support to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly the ones that “conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries”; the security forces of Pakistan are likely to be involved, materially or substantially, in “subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan”.
Obviously the authors of this bill believe, or have been persuaded to believe, that Pakistan is a rogue state, and has to be dealt with carefully and comprehensively. Hence the financial controls through the IMF and World Bank, surveillance through CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies and the privatised army of the US (Blackwater and others), and a monitoring network visualised in the bill itself.
Second, having painted a picture of Pakistan as a threat to the rest of the world, no less, the bill requires the US president, in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of section 301, to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the terrorist threat and close safe havens in Pakistan.
Not feeling quite confident about the president’s ability to develop such a strategy on his own, the legislators require him to work closely not only with the Government of Pakistan but also with other “relevant governments and organisations in the region and elsewhere” to “implement effective counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Fata, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan and parts of Punjab”.
What does this comprehensive strategy mean? Does it mean that the US may, in a fit of desperation, which is not too far away, invite “the other relevant governments” (the Indian government is near, willing and relevant) to help implement counter-terrorist efforts in any or all the areas of Pakistan so laboriously enumerated in the bill? Would the Indians be as foolish as we were to pull America’s chestnuts out of the fire that we are keeping away from their borders?
Third the definition of “civilian government” as given in subsection (d) of section 205. This is important as this section requires that the assistance “may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan”. This definition, in the negative form, is interesting: “the term ‘civilian government’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree”.
This definition implies that if the elected head of government is retained and the rest of the elected ones (the senators, MNAs and MPAs) are despatched by a coup, the residue would still be a civilian government if the head of government, so retained, operates through un-elected civilian surrogates. This formulation would have been hilarious but for the fact that it happens to be the opposite of the minus-one formula that we are so familiar with. The new formula can be described as minus-all-but-one-formula. A South Asian input?
Fourth, the bill provides not only for matters relating to the promised $7.5bn, but also for those that have nothing to do with any kind of aid or assistance to Pakistan.
The most important of such deviations is in sub-section (b) of section 203. It provides that “no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and no licence to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the secretary of state under the direction of the president, makes the certification required under sub-section (c) for such fiscal year”.
Hence, Pakistan can’t even buy defence equipment out of its own resources once the Kerry-Lugar bill is signed by the president unless all the numerous conditionalities in it are met to the satisfaction of all those monitors, reporters, sleuths, diplomats, experts and others from the US, and other ‘relevant’ countries give a no-objection certificate.
Fifth, under the provisions of sub-section (a) of section 302, the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of defence, has to report on no less than 15 areas of concern and interest, including the one about the armed forces. It requires an assessment of the extent to “which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of the military budget, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders….”
In our context senior military leaders include all one- to four-star generals i.e. all officers above the rank of colonel. One cannot think of a more effective way to de-professionalise the armed forces of Pakistan that happen to be one of the most professional in the world.
Since the Kerry-Lugar bill will be operational only if we agree to accept the offer of $1.5bn a year, it would be far better to decline this offer. Pakistan could save much more than $1.5bn a year merely by ceasing its military operations against the anti-West and anti-India militants. This is feasible as the militants have an understandable quarrel with the US and India, but can come to terms with Pakistan.
Courtesy: DAWN
Shamshad Ahmad
October 19, 2009
The Kerry-Lugar Bill was supposed to bring a “larger conceptual framework” and mutuality content to the “transactional” US-Pakistan relationship. It has done just the opposite. There has been a serious backlash in Pakistan over the intrusive conditionalities attached to US military aid which are seen by the people at large and major civil and military stakeholders in the country’s power structure as compromising national sovereignty.
The bill does no good to the US-Pakistan relationship which already has had a troubled history. Its original author, Joe Biden, while running for president in November 2007, had envisioned a new policy for Pakistan advocating the need for new dynamics in the US-Pakistan relationship with greater mutuality content and people-centred socio-economic development. His strategy envisaged moving from an issue-specific relationship to a normal, functional relationship with Pakistan.
Last year in July, Senator Joe Biden presented a bipartisan bill in the Senate involving an annual aid package of $1.5 billion for five years renewable for another five years, with an additional $1 billion as “democracy dividend,” and an appropriate “performance-based” military assistance which was to be subjected to rigorous oversight and accountability. It was a well-meaning initiative designed to strengthen democracy in Pakistan.
After the US presidential election last year, the Biden-Lugar bill became the Kerry-Lugar Bill with several changes in its content and wording. The provision on non-security assistance remained the same but the idea of a democracy dividend disappeared. Obviously the democratic credentials of the post-Musharraf NRO-based government in Islamabad were known to the US Congress. Under Section 203, some badly worded certification conditionalities were attached to the provision for military assistance to Pakistan.
There is nothing unusual with aid-related conditionalities. In fact, the very concept of foreign aid is predicated on mutually convergent obligations of donor and recipient countries inherent in their political, economic, military, moral, social and now strategic priorities. Even the famous Marshall Plan had its conditionalities to ensure the requisite oversight and accountability. But even in term of conditionalities, the donor and recipient always do lot of homework to evolve the needed convergence of mutual obligations.
In this particular case, it seems, no such homework was done. The bill became a crisis for both the PPP government and US policy makers. It was a classic example of flawed decision-making on both sides. On the Pakistani side, it was a matter of poor judgment of its own national mood and country’s vital interests. The major civilian and military stakeholders in the country, including the parliament, opposition and the army were either kept in the dark or were misinformed about the contents of the bill.
On the American side, it was yet another blatant example of closing their eyes to history, playing games with Pakistan’s weak and crumbling democracy, exploiting its vulnerable leadership, and extremely poor public diplomacy in the face of growing anti-Americanism. Joe Biden’s realistic approach for a new policy towards Pakistan was woefully distorted and once again circumscribed to Washington’s narrowly based and vaguely defined issue-specific priorities.
The major problem with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, now formally known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, is in its provisions on security-related assistance involving pre-disbursement certifications by the US Secretary of State. The first and perhaps the most ominously sensitive certification clause is the one warranting Pakistan’s continued cooperation “on the dismantling of nuclear weapon-related supplier networks and providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.”
The other certification pertained to Pakistan’s commitment to “combating terrorist groups, ceasing support, including by any elements within Pakistan military or its intelligence agency to extremists and terrorist groups, preventing Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups from operating in its territory or launching cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries and dismantling of terrorist operation bases on its soil including Quetta and Muridke.” Ironically, Pakistan is already doing all these things and daily paying a heavy price.
Perhaps the most incredulous certification requirement is the one to assure the Congress that Pakistan’s “security forces are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of the country.” This is a joke of the highest order and perhaps an opportunity for agonising soul-searching in Washington to find who has really been “subverting the constitutional, political or judicial processes” in this benighted country.
Ironically, Section 302 (the murderous section 302 in Pakistan’s legal parlance) on semi-annual “monitoring reports” also calls for “an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight, and approval of military budgets, chain of command, process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.”
This assessment, if carried out objectively, would eventually be an indictment of our civilian leadership itself for lacking the “credibility and competence” in exercising the purported “civilian control” over the military and for ineffective and poor “strategic guidance and planning.” The assessment will hopefully not omit the extent to which our elected rulers and entities are observing the sanctity of constitutional supremacy and upholding political or judicial processes in the country.
Unfortunately, in our political realm, it happens to be our current civilian leadership which is now flouting democratic norms by holding on to a dictator’s legacy, the notorious the Seventeenth Amendment. The military after Musharraf’s ouster is playing by the rules. We now have an independent judiciary. If the civilian leadership remains truthful to the Constitution, the military will have no excuse to come back. The final onus thus now rests with our civilian rulers and representatives.
The very first instance of the commitment of our rulers to democratic norms is the contempt shown to the parliament on the question of building a “national response” to the issues of our legitimate concern in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Foreign Minister Qureshi rushed post-haste to Washington without taking the parliament into confidence and reached an understanding based on a clarification from the co-authors of the bill, which has no legal status or effect.
All this notwithstanding, the amount involved in this aid package is not really big money. We can do without it. A little more efficient management of our government can easily save us twice this amount in reduced government spending and giving up of the Marco Polo culture by our leaders. The best thing would have been to thank the US for its generosity and concern for Pakistan’s democracy and development, and tell them that our people are not ready to accept any conditional aid.
Instead of giving our country as ransom, we should be fixing the fundamentals of our governance and choosing to live our own lives as an independent and self-reliant nation, free from want and ignorance and raising our children with honour and dignity, free from the fear of violence, oppression and injustice. Let us focus on domestic resource mobilization and reduce government spending. We are a food-growing country. Let’s grow food for our own people. Give up the Marco Polo culture. No more blind faith in the friends of Pakistan – let us be our own friends.
This warrants us to come out of the denial mode and agree that like India, we can also be self-reliant. Yes, we can do it, remember? After all, Obama in his inaugural address, speaking of the daunting challenges to his administration, had also said: “Yes, we can do it.”
Courtesy: The News
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Sovereignty or self-perpetuation?
Fayyaz Ali Khan
October 15, 2009
Amazingly, the people of Pakistan are being convinced to reject a US financial assistance bill which, for the first time in our history intends to help the people and bar the government from diverting these funds to the military, which many view as being the main hindrance to democracy in the country.
Why do we call it dictation when the bill bars the government from diverting these funds to the military? Isn't it a fact that so far whatever foreign aid has been given to Pakistan, most of it has been consumed by the military establishment? Is it not a fact that the sons of all the previous dictators, who all belonged to the middle or lower middle classes of our society, are today some of the richest in this country? I think we have "eaten enough grass" and the time has come to inject some nutrients in to the drained veins of the hapless masses.
Why is it being portrayed as meddling in our internal affairs when the bill, under the heading, purpose of assistance, says, "to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government"? Or when it states, under limitations on certain assistance, "the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes in Pakistan"? Is it not what our Constitution says? Or are we forgetting Chaudhry Shujaat's famous utterances that it takes only one jeep and a truck to bring about regime change in this country?
Why are we raising a ruckus over the Americans asking us not to get involved in nuclear proliferation or to stop supporting networks involved in proliferation activities given that it has been proven that certain Pakistani individuals were indeed involved in such activities? Also, what is so wrong with the certification requirement in the bill that the government of Pakistan prevent Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, from operating within the territory of Pakistan? That this also include the prevention of cross-border attacks in to neighbouring countries, the closure of terrorist training camps in FATA, and the dismantling of terrorism infrastructure in other parts of the country? If we oppose the bill what signal are sending to the rest of the world? That we are involved in nuclear proliferation and are abetting terrorism overseas?
In fact it would be fair to say that most of the anti-KL bill critics are advocating the adoption of a position that runs counter to our national interest. Also, it would be equally fair to assume that most of the critics will not have read the bill in its entirety and are also unaware of the fact that the certification clauses included in it are usual for most aid bills that the US legislature passes.
Since we say that we are responsible nation and not involved in proliferation activities or that we provide help to terrorist groups operating from our soil to carry out attacks in other countries, there should be little reason for us to oppose Kerry-Lugar. Besides, let us not forget that during the Afghan war, in return for US funding, we were supposed to cap our nuclear programme and that the US president then too was required to certify every year that this was being done. And despite that we managed to develop our nuclear deterrence.
We are projecting ourselves as a nation whose policies, instead of interests, are governed by emotions. Also, in this emotional frenzy, we fail to see that for a change – and this is perhaps a first – the aid that we receive will not go towards purchasing tanks or warplanes but towards addressing poverty, towards building schools, hospitals, improving access to clean drinking water, and on socio-economic development in general.
It is good to see parliament and the civil society debate and discuss our relationship with the US vis-à-vis the conditions attached to Kerry-Lugar. Having said that, it needs to be pointed out that the majority of criticism of the bill is coming from quarters who are known to be supporters, beneficiaries and perpetuators of the rule of the men in khaki. Since the birth of our country, our sovereignty has been time and again breached from within and not outside. I wish the Americans had translated the bill into Urdu and other regional languages so that the people could read it for themselves and see that for a change we are getting foreign aid with strings whose objective seems to be to foster socio-economic development.
The writer is a development consultant based in Peshawar. Email: fayyazalikhan@ yahoo.com
Courtesy: The News
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Transformation?
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
February 6, 2009: Senator Kerry, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "In my conversations with Admiral Mullen… there is a sense of some transformation -- of a willingness to engage in some transformation. I also find that both General Pasha and General Kayani are likewise committed."
April 17: Within 71 days of Kerry's statement, Friends of Democratic Pakistan, upon US prodding, pledged $5.28 billion.
June 11: Within 125 days of Kerry's statement, the US House of Representatives passed The Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act authorising $1.5 billion per fiscal year for non-military assistance to Pakistan plus $300 million for FY2010 and such funds as may be necessary for 'Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund' plus $300 million in Foreign Military Financing.
June 24: With 138 days of Kerry's statement, the US Senate passed The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act authorising $1.5 billion per fiscal year for non-military assistance to Pakistan.
June 2009: Congressional conferees authorised $1 billion for coalition support fund reimbursements (Pakistan receives around 80 per cent of the total) plus $896 million for embassy expansion plus $539 million in Economic Support Funds.
July 24: Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online's bureau chief in Islamabad, one of Pakistan's most perceptive journalists, wrote: "The seamless friendship between… Admiral Mullen and General Kayani has cemented the relationship between the military establishments of the two countries to levels not seen since the 1950s… The result is that Islamabad and Washington are in a position to implement coordinated, long-term policies in the region, which include action against militants, moves to improve ties between Pakistan and India, especially their dispute over divided Kashmir…"
July 30: Syed Saleem Shahzad wrote: "Intense US efforts and assurances have put Pakistan and India on track to renew their dialogue process over key contentious issues, such as divided Kashmir. An important upshot of this is that Islamabad has begun a crackdown on jihadi assets…"
August 5: Within 169 days of Kerry's statement and within 45 days of Saleem Shahzad's article, a US unmanned aerial vehicle fired two air-to-surface Hellfire missiles that killed Baitullah.
August 7: Within 171 days of Kerry's statement, the IMF increased its financial support to $11.3 billion.
August 10: Within 10 days of Saleem Shahzad's article, India's Ministry of Home Affairs began withdrawing four battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force from the border.
August 12: Within 180 days of Kerry's statement, the Ministry of Defence told The News that "32 officers have been retired and others will be fired within the next few months in government efforts to streamline the ISI."
August 18: Lieutenant-General Nadeem told Reuters, "The Pakistan army was short of equipment…" The same day, Holbrooke assured that the US shall "expedite delivery of equipment requested by the Pakistani army."
For the record, within days of Kerry's February 6 statement, US drones shifted focus to the anti-Pakistan Taliban in South Waziristan. Since February 6, with an average of one strike a week, South Waziristan has been hit 23 times; areas controlled by Baitullah have been hit 15 times. For the record, Mian Habib-ur-Rehman of Harkat died in police custody and Shah Abdul Aziz of Jaish was sent to Adiala. Qari Saifullah was arrested on August 17 and Maulvi Omar the following day.
Our strategic thinkers have long considered home-grown terrorists as tourists with guns. Are they now shifting their sail with the wind? Or, are they actually turning on their jihadi assets? Kerry seems convinced that a 'transformation' is underway. And, Kerry may only be older than I am by a day but he is wiser than I am by a year.
Aug 23,2009
Courtesy: The News
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The Kerry-Lugar debate
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Zafar Hilaly
Imagine the Americans, of all people, destabilising Pakistan; which is what Congress has done by acting petulantly and adding intrusive, unenforceable and gratuitously offensive conditions to Kerry-Lugar. Why? Because their favourite dictator played fast and loose with the money gifted to him by Bush, leaving America $13 billion poorer with nothing to show for it. The conditions are in place also because the Congress, reluctant to blame the poor performance of the military in Afghanistan, needs a scapegoat; someone to vent their anger on, to explain why Osama is still free, why Hikmatyar and Haqqani are gathering recruits, why Karzai, their hand-picked overlord of Afghanistan turned is a brazen vote thief and why Americans continue to die in Afghanistan in increasing numbers.
But tempting as it was to blame and humiliate Pakistan, viewed by many in the Congress as a reluctant, inefficient, fickle even duplicitous ally, the latter should have resisted the temptation – simply because alienating Pakistan is a self-defeating exercise which would prove as disastrous for America as much as for the stability and security of the region as a whole. Sadly, an irate Congress, goaded by the many lobbies that have a claim on the voting preferences of Congressmen and, one suspects, some inexplicably poor handling by appointees of the Zardari government, coalesced to produce a mega public relations disaster.
Kerry Lugar may have been drafted to ensure that America's money, all of $1.5 million annually (amounting to nine hours worth of expenditure that is incurred by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan) will not be lost but in the process America has jeopardised something worth much more, and that is not only the little remaining goodwill that existed for her in Pakistan, but, more importantly, the prospects of their staunch ally, Mr Zardari. Eventually, the harm done to the notion that democracy is the best form of government for Pakistan may prove to be the most damaging outcome inflicted by the Congress. In fact, Mark Twain once wrote about the members of the Congress: "Reader, suppose you were an idiot; and suppose you were a member of Congress; but I repeat myself."
That is not to say that the Zardari government, which was badly let down by whoever are its advisers, will fall. It will not, hopefully. But the little recovery that Mr Zardari's standing seemed to be making in the polls, from the depths to which public regard for him had plunged, after his disastrous volte face on the restoration of the CJ, has evaporated. Time, if it ever was, is no longer on the side of Mr Zardari.
Notwithstanding the provocation, in the debate outside the National Assembly unfortunately, not for the first time, instinct and emotion has prevailed over common sense and considered judgement. Patriotism in Pakistan is not only the last resort of the scoundrel but the first bolt hole of the hypocrite. Of course, when the TV anchors took over the story the facts too became extinct.
Actually, there are only two conditions in the Kerry-Lugar Bill that are glaringly offensive; the others do not deserve the hysterical attention they received. In brief, Kerry Lugar offers Pakistan much needed assistance in the civil and military sphere over an extended period of time, in the hope that, in return, Pakistan will abide by her own laws regarding non-proliferation, forbidding the use of her territory by extremists, dismantling of such terror groups that remain and that all political players on the national scene abide by Pakistan's own constitution which forbids military takeovers and vests all authority, including matters concerning the nations defence, in the hands of a elected civilian government. However, the clause relating to the appointments and promotions in the military are fatuous and anyway impossible to monitor.
Besides, Pakistan is not bound by the conditions laid down by Congress nor by accepting the money is Pakistan accepting the conditionalities. That is merely Congress informing the administration of what it desires and what the latter should be looking out for when submitting its periodic report to Congress on the security related portion of the bill. Lest the administration still feels constrained and it is in the national interest of the US, Congress has allowed the President a free hand to waive all the conditions. Of one thing we can be sure, it will never be in the national interest of the United States to shun Pakistan's effective cooperation in the battle against terrorism.
Actually, what is most surprising about Kerry-Lugar is the gullibility of Congress. Imagine believing that when it comes to the crunch Pakistan will not act in her own interest just because Congress will be upset, or because a mere billion dollars (two to three per cent of the annual national budget) will not be available.
When has Pakistan not acted in accordance with her own wishes? Pakistan befriended China (1960) even though America had branded China as an international leper; Pakistan went to war with India twice (1965 and 1971) without caring what America might think, feel or do; Kissinger's threat (1975) that America would make a "horrible example" of Pakistan was brushed off as just so much hot air as Pakistan proceeded apace with her nuclear weapon programme; Pakistan exploded a nuclear device (1998) despite the repeated entreaties of an American President; Pakistan's nuclear scientists stole (and sadly sold) nuclear secrets notwithstanding American strictures to the contrary; even Musharraf, the supine Commando, took the money offered by Bush (2001-2008) thumbed his nose at the US and did with it what he wished; he even thought nothing of starting a war with India (1999) by capturing their defences in Kargil; earlier Pakistan said no to America's request to despatch forces to Vietnam (1970) and subsequently Iraq (2003).
The list of instances where we did, and do, what suits us is long. Like America, we too have always chosen to be faithful to America in our own way. Why then suddenly do our super patriots believe we will act differently after Kerry-Lugar?
Of course there are defects in the bill. It is a crassly crude method of taking to task the democratic dispensation that exists today for the follies of several dictators whom they supported and propped up. Besides, the Americans cannot draw up an indictment against a whole people or insult them merely to register their sense of hurt at the manner their money or interests had been handled by an earlier discredited coterie. For the Americans to shout "thief" today and start taking precautions when they were aware of the robbery years ago and chose to do nothing is knavish not merely foolish.
Nevertheless, we cannot let sentiment override national interest. America's support is important for a host of reasons and especially so when terrorists bent on taking over Pakistan have to be thwarted. There will be time enough, once this threat is eliminated, for point scoring and recrimination. Neither America nor Pakistan can afford to wreck cooperation forged over a difficult decade just to indulge their pique, or an irate Congress, that seems to have lost its marbles. A way out has to be found and lessons learnt.
Courtesy: The News
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Winning hearts, avoiding waste
Monday, October 12, 2009
Abid Hasan
Finally the much awaited Kerry-Lugar Bill has been approved by the US Congress. And what was being heralded as a new chapter in the bumpy Pakistan-US relationship has, unfortunately, started off on an awful note. Instead of the US getting kudos for providing Pakistan with billions of dollars at a time when the former is going through its worst economic crisis, the US is being vilified in an environment which was anti-American to begin with. So what should it do now?
First, it must do quick damage control with regard to the conditionalities related to security assistance, which are seen by most — other than the government – as intrusive and insulting to a sovereign state. Even if the detractors are wrong, it is not the reality but the perception that is driving this sentiment and widening the trust deficit. Surely, it is not in the interest of the US to start a new relationship on a sour note. The vast majority of Pakistanis fully subscribe to the letter and spirit of the conditionalities, and they expect their parliament and government to implement these. Rather than imposing these as conditions, it would be better to include them in the preamble of the bill as stated policy of the Pakistan Government and as expectations of the US from us.
Second, the bill should include, in the preamble, broad principles and specific actions with respect to good governance including (i) establishing a strong and independent anti-corruption institution; (ii) strong and independent Election Commission; (iii) effective laws and mechanisms to minimise abuse of office by holders of public office, especially parliamentarians, ministers, judges and senior civil and military officials. An important element of this would be independent audit of tax and wealth returns filed by these public office holders; (iv) effective transparency and oversight of public procurement. Although the inclusion of such clauses in the bill would make the political and civil/military elite nervous, these are absolutely critical for sustaining democracy and development and for effective use of Pakistani ( and US ) taxpayers’ money. US’s seeming indifference to quality of governance and corruption will be perceived as badly by ordinary folks as the perception that US supports military rule.
Third, the US needs to make sure that the billions of dollars that it spends do make a difference in the lives of millions of ordinary people. Here, the US must incorporate the following two key lessons of development history while finalising the use of its funds: (i) aid only improves public services for the poor when good governance is in place in the recipient country. The US must recognise that bad governance leads to bad results and big money attracts big crooks; (ii) aid needs to be strategic and selective. If it tries to fix all public services, the managerial and financial resources will be spread too thin and will not have any discernable impact.
The government is urging USAID to channel its funds through government institutions, not because of the conviction that this will lead to improvements in social and human development indictors, but because it wants to have its hands and feet in the money bag. Where the quality of governance is good, using government institutions would be the right thing to do. However, in Pakistan’s context, using government institutions runs the high risk of aid being wasted and pocketed. The example of billions of aid dollars poured into the Social Action Programme during the 90s should be an eye opener for the USAID. For the most part, all Pakistan was left with after 10 years was thousands of ghost schools, ghost BHUs, and ghost teachers and health workers, and little, if any, improvement in the social indicators. USAID will contribute to the graveyard of good intentions if it falls into the trap of using government institutions under the present circumstances, eerily resembling the 90s. USAID should leave the fixing of dysfunctional government institutions to the government itself – donors simply cannot fix the deep-seated poor governance and policies.
Moreover, the amount — $1.5 billion — while significant, is no more than 15 per cent of the annual government expenditures in the long list of activities included in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Hence, if USAID is allocated to all these activities, funds will be spread thin and unlikely to have any noticeable impact so it is important to be strategic, selective and hard-nosed in the allocation of aid funds.
Taking into account the lessons of development history and governance realities on the ground, the following could be key elements of a strategic and selective strategy to effectively use billions of dollars and win the hearts and minds of millions of ordinary Pakistanis.
In case of education, allocation of $3-4 billion would be required for the following activities; (i) a stipend programme for all middle/secondary school girls in government schools and low-fee well governed private schools, with the stipend varying by district and grade — higher for girls in districts with low enrollment, and lower for lower grades. Such a nation-wide programme, which has been successfully implemented in Bangladesh and many developing countries, could increase the girls’ enrollment, provide an incentive to poor families to keep girls in school all the way through secondary school and increase the incomes of poor families; (ii) a new high quality secondary school, one each for boys and girls in each tehsil and a high quality university (like LUMS) in each district where only students from government schools would be allowed to enroll. Each school and university would be an independent legal entity, governed by a board comprising civil society leaders, nazim and EDO Education; (iii) an endowment fund to fully fund the operational costs of the above schools and universities for 25-30 years after which they would be handed over to government or local philanthropists.
In case of health, a similar allocation of $3-4 billion would be required to establish; (i) a well functioning health system comprising first level/emergency care facility in each tehsil and a modern hospital in each district. Each of these facilities would be independent entities with their own boards and have features; (ii) an endowment fund to fully fund the operational costs of these facilities for 25-30 years, after which they would be handed over to government or local philanthropists.
Operating in the business-as-usual mode will be a sure kiss of waste. The US will neither achieve the human development goals, nor its goals to establish a new chapter in its relationship with the government and people of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan may be perceived as corrupt and wasteful when US taxpayers see limited impact on the ground in 10 years. Clearly, the proposed way of spending USAID funds would not make government functionaries of the day very happy for it would rob them of the opportunity to siphon off aid as all previous governments have done. A programme along the above lines would ensure effective use of USAID funds and would benefit millions of ordinary Pakistanis. It would also dot the Pakistani landscape with thousands of visible “islands of excellence for the poor”, continuously reminding the people of US’s contributions to our country for nation building.
Courtesy: The News
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Pakistan Gets Billions, But What About Scrutiny?
By:Saad Khan
The Pakistani government must be happy now as they are able to get billions of dollars in aid both from the United States and the international community of donors.The US Senate approved the Kerry Lugar bill that will allow the disbursement of $7.5 billion dollars in civilian aid over the course of five years.The aid roughly translates to $1.5 billion a year.The Zardari government as expected has welcomed this aid though they are not satisfied with just $7.5 billion they want billions more and are expecting another aid package from the US.Additionally they are also looking to their 'friends' in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) a group created in September 2008 to help the nascent Pakistani democratic government to tackle extremist elements.President Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown participated in a recent meeting of the group on September 24th.Zardari was also in attendance.
The Brown government has pledged 50 million Pounds in assistance to Pakistan.Other members of the group have also pledged some help in this regard.Major donors to the FoDP include the US UK Saudi Arabia Turkey UAE Japan and the Asian Development Bank.They initially pledged $5.1 billion in aid during a conference in Tokyo and the recent pledges represent a reassurance from the donors that they are eager to bring Pakistan out of its financial crisis.But do they need to do this while their own economies are badly suffering? This is a valid question being asked by Americans as their country is donating the largest chunk of money to Pakistan.Critics also cite the incompetent governance and widespread corruption in Pakistan which includes charges of financial embezzlement against Zardari (he was known as Mr.10% for requesting that amount as a commission on every deal).Nawaz Sharif another popular leader of Pakistan and now the main opposition leader was also accused of corruption during his two time premiership.
A recent report by Transparency International has raised serious questions about the competency of the Pakistani government.While financial embezzlement is not a new thing in Pakistan and the Pakistani government would be ready to enjoy the great 'financial feast' offered by the US American taxpayers might not be ready to accept this deal.Although there is news about tight scrutiny of the aid package the US government needs to ensure that the aid goes to the right people and not to the corrupt government agencies or fake non governmental organizations.The case of Pakistan is a complex one and needs international attention.If the US wants to gain a positive feeling among common Pakistanis it has to ensure direct aid to the masses instead of spending taxpayer money on corrupt government agencies.The importance of scrutiny and accountability has increased further as donor countries are facing deep recessions.The aid is good but needs to be spent thoughtfully on the right organizations.Only then can the US government achieve some of its strategic goals in the region.
Courtesy: huffingtonpost
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Kerry-Lugar
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
Democrat Barack Obama was elected president of the US by 69,456,897 American voters. Democrat John Kerry was elected US senator from Massachusetts. Republican Richard Lugar was elected US senator from Indiana. Obama swore to "faithfully execute the Office of the President of the US" and to the best of his ability "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the US". Senators Kerry and Lugar swore that they would "support and defend the Constitution of the US against all enemies, foreign and domestic…" The president receives $193,400 per year to "faithfully execute the Office of the President of the US" and each senator gets an annual salary of $174,000 for defending the "Constitution of the US against all enemies, foreign and domestic…"
Make no mistake, the Kerry-Lugar Bill is to safeguard and protect the interests of the US. The authors of the bill along with each and every mover of the bill is under legal obligation to 'preserve, protect and defend' the interests of the Untied States. Lo and behold! Pak-US interests can converge.
Q1. What are the conditionalities? Answer: No "security-related assistance may be provided… until the secretary of state… makes the certification (sec 203)." Amazingly, $750 million per year worth of non-security-related assistance has no condition and the condition for the other $750 million per year is that the president's special representative shall certify that Pakistan is making "reasonable progress" as per the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report. Q2. Does Kerry-Lugar compromise Pakistan's sovereignty? Answer: Kerry-Lugar was passed in late-September. Pakistan's sovereignty was compromised on June 13, 2009, when our minister of state for finance declared Pakistan's resources to be Rs1.78 trillion while expenditures were estimated at Rs2.46 trillion. The very day that our National Assembly admitted that we would be soliciting charity to fill the Rs700 billion deficit our sovereignty was compromised. Pakistan's sovereignty was compromised further on July 27 when our minister for commerce announcing Pakistan's trade policy had set our export target at $18.8 billion (our import bill for 2007-08 was $35.4 billion). The very day that our very own minister declared that we would be asking for alms to fill the $16.6 billion trade deficit our sovereignty was compromised.
Q3: What does Kerry-Lugar say about Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad? Answer: The government of Pakistan should make progress on "preventing Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad from operating in the territory of Pakistan…" For the record, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad were both banned by the government of Pakistan in 2002. Q4: What does Kerry-Lugar say about our nuclear infrastructure? Answer: Three things: one, Pakistan shall "prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise". Two, that US assistance should not be directed to the expansion of nuclear stockpile. Three, Pakistan shall "dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials." We should not have any problem with the first two; it is really not in our interest to be the source of proliferation and the donor certainly has the right to impose restrictions on where his money cannot be spent. Yes, number three could be problematic as we are in an arms race with India.
Q5: What does Kerry-Lugar say about India? Answer: "It is critical to Pakistan's long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan". Q6: What does Kerry-Lugar say about Quetta and Muridke? Answer: The government of Pakistan shall make progress in "dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke…"
On the brighter side of things, beggars can never be bankrupts and beggars shall fear no rebellion.
04 Oct 2009
Courtesy: The News
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Kerry-Lugar — a bitter pill
Monday, October 12, 2009
Malik Amin Aslam
Over the years, Pakistan’s relationship with the US has been anything but stable. It has wildly oscillated from an awkward mutual dependence and inescapable reliance to being hindered with mistrust. Right from inception, it has been a continuous roller coaster ride which has witnessed endearing periods of the Afghan War, the current war against terrorism leading to Pakistan’s acceptance as a non-NATO ally in 2004 and the much acclaimed US disaster relief efforts during the 2005 earthquake. At the same time, it has endured the much ostracised, US indifference in the 1971 war with India, the Carter Aid suspension in 1979, biting Pressler Amendments in 1985, sudden Bush aid suspension in 1990, unfulfilled F-16s delivery and the biased Indian nuclear deal of 2007.
In this fluctuating backdrop, the Kerry-Lugar Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009 was formulated to stabilise and alter this transactional relationship. The genesis and subsequent shaping of the bill makes for a very interesting analysis.
Without a doubt, the chief architect and leading advocate of this long-term engagement with Pakistan is Joe Biden, the current US Vice-President and former head of the Senate foreign relations committee. In the US, he has long been recognised as one of the leading experts on Pakistan and it did not come as a surprise when he articulated a fresh and new approach to Pakistan in a defining speech at the Centre for US Global Engagement in 2007. This was heralded as a well-intentioned call to alter the US-Pakistan association. The intended shift was premised on four pillars: the tripling of Non-security aid to $1.5 billion/annum while ensuring that it is untied and unconditional; linking all security aid to Pakistan upon certain calibrated performance benchmarks; awarding a democracy dividend of $1 billion to Pakistan; and focusing on a renewed and sustained engagement with the country.
The approach explicitly mentioned the need to sensitise US policy to the issues of Kashmir and Palestine and of revisiting matters such as the US visa policy for Pakistan. Moreover, as a support to Pakistan’s stability, it called for the redoubling of war efforts in Afghanistan including the institution of a Marshall plan for the country’s future development needs. This well thought out approach was formalised as the Biden-Lugar Bill and aimed to secure US interests in this region by forging a lasting relationship with Pakistan. It was to leverage democratic and economic stability for this front-line ally of the US. On its part, economically burdened and dreadfully fatigued by the on-going war, Pakistan hoped for recognition for its war effort and a bail-out from some of the associated challenges.
However, the noble intentions with which the associated bill started its journey expediently went astray somewhere along the approval process. The current version of the bill whose approval was proudly owned up to and announced by Obama in New York marks a significant and almost seismic shift from the Biden philosophy.
To start with the bill, which now stands approved by both houses, reads like a charge sheet accusing Pakistan of all the “wrongs” in the on-going war. The proposed democratic dividend has been stripped off the bill along with any mention of the Kashmir issue. The intended unconditional non-security aid of $1.5 billion is now strapped and burdened with all sorts of provisos ranging from “dismantling and defeating” Al Qaeda, eliminating “safe havens” and facilitating and ensuring non-proliferation – all of which sound good to the ear but are conditions almost impossible to meet. Considering the fact that the US and mighty NATO alliance has failed to live up to the above conditions in Afghanistan, it can be easily deduced that Pakistan is inevitably destined to fall short of the unreasonable expectations.
To add insult to our collective intelligence, the thinly veiled references to preventing attacks in neighbouring countries (read India) and giving interrogation access to individuals accused of proliferation (read A Q Khan) have been included. Moreover, the democratic safety provisions which on the face of it ensure that US, unlike the past, will favour dealing with civilian governments are all linked to exit waivers which can be conveniently invoked citing US security interests. Finally, the so-called partnership package now seems more like a carte blanche license for imperialistic interventions and intrusive meddling.
The final shape of the bill may now be a fait accompli. The route and ominous direction of its transformation points first and foremost towards a failure of our foreign policy gurus or the expensive lobbyists engaged in the US who allowed a move of stated good intentions to transform into a bill of national humiliation. Secondly, it seems that the earlier stated intentions of the Biden doctrine were just that – stated and not actual intentions. His recent philosophical shift from advocating a redoubling of efforts in Afghanistan to now asking for a renewed war focus on Pakistan and the associated announcement through US officials of the sudden birth of the Quetta Shura gives dangerous credence to the theory of shifting the theater of war into Pakistan.
As is evident from the national debate following the announcement of the bill, there is divided opinion. An elitist minority feels that our already announced budgetary and trade deficits pre-ordained our status as beggars who obviously can’t be choosers and have to live with this humiliation. The majority of the populace, however, dreams of a different Pakistan. A Pakistan where budget deficits are treated not through the begging bowl but by digging deeper into its own resources and strapping the extravagance of its leaders. A nuclear Pakistan which can restore its pride and dignity and assert its geo-political situation to its advantage. A Pakistan which needs to “rethink” its role in an endless war which has drained its economy of $36 billion is now at the verge of enslaving it for a paltry $1.5 billion. This populace is beginning to aggressively question. Is the national humiliation worth the Lugar pill?
Pakistan’s previous relationship with the US abruptly ended in the 90s after the quick and unceremonious exit of the US from Afghanistan. At that time, Pakistan felt abandoned and betrayed like a used tissue. This present romance, unfortunately, seems to be headed towards another ignoble future battered by an endless war and aided by the degrading bill designed to jeopardise any sustained longevity of this relationship.
Courtesy: The News
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Kerry-Lugar trap
By Iqbal Jafar
Monday, 12 Oct, 2009
THE Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar bill, is a good example of bureaucratic legalese where the intended meaning may not be clear, nor intended to be clear, and what may be clear, may not be intended.
For starters, the reader may, by way of an experiment in semantics, substitute the words ‘control of’ for the words ‘partnership with’ in the title of the bill, and then read the text again. Suddenly, the text would become simple and clear like a nursery rhyme, though not as funny. At this point we can begin to explore the hidden implications of the provisions of the bill.
First, what is more important is not whether the amount of assistance is too meagre or the conditionalities too many, but the assumptions behind specific matters of concern enumerated in subsection (c) of section 203. The secretary of state has to certify progress on these matters (six in number) every year.
The assumptions that could justify the need for yearly certification are: “supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials” have not yet been dismantled; the Government of Pakistan including “elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agencies” have yet to cease support to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly the ones that “conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries”; the security forces of Pakistan are likely to be involved, materially or substantially, in “subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan”.
Obviously the authors of this bill believe, or have been persuaded to believe, that Pakistan is a rogue state, and has to be dealt with carefully and comprehensively. Hence the financial controls through the IMF and World Bank, surveillance through CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies and the privatised army of the US (Blackwater and others), and a monitoring network visualised in the bill itself.
Second, having painted a picture of Pakistan as a threat to the rest of the world, no less, the bill requires the US president, in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of section 301, to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the terrorist threat and close safe havens in Pakistan.
Not feeling quite confident about the president’s ability to develop such a strategy on his own, the legislators require him to work closely not only with the Government of Pakistan but also with other “relevant governments and organisations in the region and elsewhere” to “implement effective counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Fata, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan and parts of Punjab”.
What does this comprehensive strategy mean? Does it mean that the US may, in a fit of desperation, which is not too far away, invite “the other relevant governments” (the Indian government is near, willing and relevant) to help implement counter-terrorist efforts in any or all the areas of Pakistan so laboriously enumerated in the bill? Would the Indians be as foolish as we were to pull America’s chestnuts out of the fire that we are keeping away from their borders?
Third the definition of “civilian government” as given in subsection (d) of section 205. This is important as this section requires that the assistance “may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan”. This definition, in the negative form, is interesting: “the term ‘civilian government’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree”.
This definition implies that if the elected head of government is retained and the rest of the elected ones (the senators, MNAs and MPAs) are despatched by a coup, the residue would still be a civilian government if the head of government, so retained, operates through un-elected civilian surrogates. This formulation would have been hilarious but for the fact that it happens to be the opposite of the minus-one formula that we are so familiar with. The new formula can be described as minus-all-but-one-formula. A South Asian input?
Fourth, the bill provides not only for matters relating to the promised $7.5bn, but also for those that have nothing to do with any kind of aid or assistance to Pakistan.
The most important of such deviations is in sub-section (b) of section 203. It provides that “no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and no licence to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the secretary of state under the direction of the president, makes the certification required under sub-section (c) for such fiscal year”.
Hence, Pakistan can’t even buy defence equipment out of its own resources once the Kerry-Lugar bill is signed by the president unless all the numerous conditionalities in it are met to the satisfaction of all those monitors, reporters, sleuths, diplomats, experts and others from the US, and other ‘relevant’ countries give a no-objection certificate.
Fifth, under the provisions of sub-section (a) of section 302, the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of defence, has to report on no less than 15 areas of concern and interest, including the one about the armed forces. It requires an assessment of the extent to “which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of the military budget, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders….”
In our context senior military leaders include all one- to four-star generals i.e. all officers above the rank of colonel. One cannot think of a more effective way to de-professionalise the armed forces of Pakistan that happen to be one of the most professional in the world.
Since the Kerry-Lugar bill will be operational only if we agree to accept the offer of $1.5bn a year, it would be far better to decline this offer. Pakistan could save much more than $1.5bn a year merely by ceasing its military operations against the anti-West and anti-India militants. This is feasible as the militants have an understandable quarrel with the US and India, but can come to terms with Pakistan.
Courtesy: DAWN
Indo-Pak Relations
Indian interest in
Brig Asif Haroon Raja
Brig AsifIndia succeeded in creating
When
In the meanwhile another organisation MQM under Altaf Hussain surfaced in
The CIA and MI-6 also had a role in giving added muscle to the MQM; it was induced by dangling the carrot of converting
Though Pak-US closeness in 1980s due to Afghan war upset Indian designs, RAW continued with its covert operations in rural and urban Sindh and succeeded in accentuating antagonism between old and new Sindhis. Side by side,
Within this narrowest waistline, road-rail communication run perilously close to the border and its interdiction severs Sindh from rest of the country. Umarkot-Chhor sector leading to
Having acquired the requisite desert capability, an attempt was made in 1985-86 in the form of Exercise Brass-tacks which was conducted perilously close to our border in the desert belt. It fizzled out because of
With the coming in of George Bush in power in January 2001, talk of balkanisation of
In December 2007 military standoff which continued till May 2008, bulk of Indian strike formations had assembled in areas opposite to the Reti-Rahimyar Khan waistline in Kishangarh area with the hope that with a little push, restive Sindh would revolt. Although
Laid down objectives will be achieved preferably through covert means alone supplemented by Kerry-Lugar bill, or limited attacks by Indian forces, or combination of limited attacks and all out Indo-Pak war depending upon the success achieved in battle of frontiers and neutralisation of our nukes. Sudden flurry of terrorist attacks in Peshawar, Kohat, Shangla, Lahore, GHQ and Islamabad and maximisation of pressure to commence operation in Waziristan as well as in South Punjab, desire to attack alleged Afghan Taliban Shura with drones in Balochistan and sudden closure of security check posts by Afghan government along its border attached with Bajaur are not without ulterior motives. I repeat my warning that November-December will be critical. Although operation in South Waziristan has started with a bang, however, our fight against terrorists must not be at the cost of lowering our operational preparedness against our arch enemy which has never missed an opportunity to harm Pakistan.I will write about Indian war plan in my next article.
Courtesy: Opinion-maker
M Saeed Khalid
October 17, 2009
After days of blowing hot and cold, the Indians have signalled that they are ready to talk to Pakistan. Only a few days back, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told journalists that the existing state of bilateral relations was not conducive to a move ahead. We should critically analyse the prospects of talks being scheduled at foreign ministers or foreign secretaries level.
Why did Mr Singh sound so pessimistic only a few weeks after trying to convince his MPs that some talks with Pakistan were better than no talks after the two prime ministers had agreed in Egypt that talks would go ahead to end the hiatus resulting from the November mayhem in Mumbai. Mr Singh's remarks were amplified by claims of Indian ministers about the lack of action by Pakistan on India's demands concerning Hafiz Saeed and others.
The Indian side appeared to be turning its back on a process that brought a tangible improvement in relations with Pakistan. India may have been miffed at the slow progress in prosecuting those it holds responsible for the Mumbai attack. But was that enough reason to abandon the composite dialogue, which has been a useful format to address contentious matters between the two nations, including terrorist threats? Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gilani commented that suspension of the dialogue only benefited the terrorists.
In order to fully understand India's reticence on engaging Pakistan, we may have to look beyond our bilateral relations. The United States has played a major role in facilitating the India-Pakistan dialogue, to create conditions which would allow Pakistan to deal effectively with terrorism on its western borders in an atmosphere of easing tensions with India. In parallel, Washington had moved its strategic partnership with India to new heights, the civil nuclear accord being its centrepiece. This American role had an unannounced caveat whereby a downturn in Indo-American friendship would collaterally damage the dialogue process with Pakistan unless it had gathered considerable traction of its own. In reality, the Mumbai killings proved to be a body blow to the peace process between the two countries, reminding everyone how shooting outside the Indian Parliament in December 2001 had brought the two sides to the precipice.
The dialogue process was launched as a mechanism of engagement which would enable the two countries to resolve disputes and enter into an interlocking system of CBMs to prevent another warlike situation. The process survived the BJP's departure from power because the Bush administration continued to support it while maintaining its policy of building a special relationship with India. The US also continued to place her bets on President Musharraf remaining at the top of a post-election setup in Pakistan.
All that changed between August 2008 and January 2009, with both Musharraf and Bush leaving office. In a sense, the composite dialogue has been orphaned. It could have been brought up by foster parents if Mumbai had not happened. But behind the scenes, what may have hurt the chances of its revival is the antipathy between the new US administration and the Indian leadership, rooted in serious policy differences which show no sign of abating. As a result, a structured dialogue with Pakistan no longer carries the value addition in the eyes of the Indian leadership that it had in the Bush era.
Traditionally, Democrats in the US were considered friends of India while the Republicans were seen tilting towards Pakistan. The "tilt" came to an end under Bush Sr. However, it was during the eight-year presidency of Bush Jr. that we witnessed a remarkable overture in the direction of India, steered by Ambassador Robert Blackwill in New Delhi, and fully supported by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Her move to the State Department in the second term of Bush further reinforced the India initiative with more determined efforts to push through Congress the India-US civil nuclear accord despite objections from the non-proliferation lobby.
This unusual warming for India was generally attributed to the US desire to build India as a counterweight to China. Publicly, Washington had no hesitation in taking the posture that it wanted to "help" India become a global power and that could happen if New Delhi resolved the outstanding differences with its smaller neighbours. Hence, the importance of resolving disputes with Pakistan, notably the one over Jammu and Kashmir.
It is not clear how seriously India took the US mantra. But it is well known that India was mightily annoyed when candidate Obama sought to link success in the fight against terrorism to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. For India, Obama erred further by appointing a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with purported outreach to India. Alongside, a whole range of differences have come to the surface over the past few months.
Obama is considered too protectionist for India's outsourcing business. India is unhappy over limits on work visas for its skilled manpower. Rice, who spearheaded the push for a strategic partnership with India, has been replaced by Hillary Clinton, who adores India and yet is criticised for not including India in her first Asian tour. To many in India, the Obama administration seems to be lacking in enthusiasm for a speedy implementation of the civil nuclear accord.
And why is there so much pressure on India about signing the CTBT that would deprive it of possibilities of further nuclear testing? To complicate life further, the existing differences over WTO negotiations and other trade issues could get worse, dampening the mutual desire to keep the special relationship going. India may be disappointed over America's inability to ensure Pakistan's "compliance" with India's wish list regarding jihadi outfits. Finally, the claims by India about infiltration across the LoC would again indirectly give cause for complaint that the US is not exerting enough pressure on Pakistan.
This inventory of Indo-US irritants shows how far things have moved from the mutual admiration seen during the Bush presidency. Viewed from Pakistan's perspective, the framework of India-Pakistan détente, built with US support, may not survive if the Indo-American alliance suffers a setback. India may consider itself liberated from the commitments undertaken so far and feel free to deal with Pakistan as it did before the composite dialogue, piece by piece, as expedient under India's perceived national mood.
But Pakistan need not be overly regretful if the dialogue process is pushed to the backburner because, as neighbours, we have to conduct relations with India even if the previous arrangement is disowned by it due to multiple reasons.
Rather than repeatedly seeking India's return to the composite-dialogue process, we need to modulate our public insistence on talks, to disabuse India of the notion that they would be doing a favour just by sitting across the table from us. India will come back to the composite form if it sees some added value. If not, US insistence can persuade the Indian side to grudgingly agree to some form of talks in the coming months. However, progress in the talks will be tied by New Delhi to court proceedings in Pakistan against those suspected of links to the Mumbai attacks.
India should realise that the onus for providing evidence would largely be on New Delhi. Anti-terrorism court proceedings can be very long and satisfaction is not guaranteed. The two governments, therefore, need to take other steps to safeguard the gains made through the dialogue process. They owe it to their people, with or without America's urging, to avoid returning to a sterile period in their bilateral relations.
Courtesy: The News
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A joint fight against terror
16 Oct, 2009
NEW DELHI should realise that the road to Beijing goes through Islamabad. This is what a Pakistan foreign minister told me many years ago. There is some truth in this even today.
Likewise, Islamabad would have known by now that its route to Kabul lies through New Delhi. This is not to suggest that India is helping Afghanistan in its armed struggle against the Taliban. What it means is that New Delhi can wield influence over Kabul.
The hospital it has built in Kabul and the roads and power transmission lines it has laid there despite the killings of Indian engineers and workers have earned the Manmohan Singh government the trust of an average Afghan. This goodwill can benefit Islamabad if it can have even a workable relationship with New Delhi.
Another attack on India’s embassy in Kabul recently is nothing new from the point of view of the Taliban who regard India as their enemy and economic development an anti-war measure. But the alleged role of the ISI in such attacks is difficult to comprehend.
Mistrust between India and Pakistan clouds judgment. Yet both have known to their cost that the Taliban consider them their enemy. The recent attack on the army headquarters at Rawalpindi reconfirms the fact that when it comes to causing harm, the Taliban make no distinction between Islamic Pakistan and secular India.
Why have not New Delhi and Islamabad sat together to plan a common strategy? Kashmir does not have to be sorted out before solving other problems. The situation in Afghanistan is too serious for further delay. Every gain that the Taliban make in Pakistan is at the expense of India’s security. But certain irritants need to be removed. Islamabad should give up the idea of having Afghanistan as its area of strategic depth.
Kabul lives under the fear that Islamabad is out to belittle or destroy it. Just as the stability of Pakistan is essential for the stability of India, Afghanistan’s viability is necessary for Pakistan’s viability. Essentially, the fight against the Taliban is the fight for a free world.
But the most important step for India and Pakistan is joint, concerted action against the Taliban. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said at a press conference in Mumbai: “If we work together to deal with this menace (terrorism), a [larger] good can come out of it.”
Pakistan’s allegation that India is trying to export terrorism does not help the situation. Manmohan Singh’s charactersing it as “a false accusation” should set doubts in Pakistan at rest. Manmohan Singh has seldom personally rubbished a statement. The real problem is Gen Stanley McChrystal’s assessment. The top US commander in Afghanistan has said that India was adding to regional tensions and encouraging counter-measures. At the same time, it was indicated that Indian activities benefit the Afghan people. The economic measures which New Delhi has undertaken in Afghanistan are bound to endear India in the eyes of the Afghans.
The American commander’s assessment can be a talking point between New Delhi and Islamabad. When both agree that the Taliban are the biggest menace they can surely find a common strategy for joint action. They can adopt different ways, economic or military, but they should have one policy to tackle the Taliban.
Pakistan’s reluctance to move troops from the Indian border to Afghanistan is understandable. Islamabad is making the same point which New Delhi was making when it was in the midst of a war with China in 1962. Pakistan has argued that while it is concentrating its full attention on fighting the Taliban, India should not in any way be disturbing it on the border.
In 1962, both US President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan had told Gen Ayub not to take such steps as would in any way distract New Delhi’s attention from fighting against China. Jawaharlal Nehru’s fear was that Ayub would march into Kashmir once India withdrew its forces from the border with Pakistan. Gen P.N. Thapar, chief of the Indian army, asked for the government’s permission to move the troops from the Pakistan border to the theatre of war in Assam.
Washington and London talked to Islamabad and assured New Delhi on Pakistan’s behalf that it would not attack India. Only then did India withdraw one division from the Pakistan border. Krishna Menon, then India’s defence minister, was opposed to the move. He considered Pakistan more of an enemy than China. Still Thapar withdrew the troops after getting Nehru’s permission.
Ayub did not open a second front, although it was an opportune moment for him to do so. Still Ayub used the opportunity to give China the northern areas of Kashmir, then under Pakistan. He wanted to establish closer relations with Beijing. Islamabad has followed that policy strictly.
Pakistani rulers, like Nehru, have conveyed more or less the same fears in similar words to the Americans who have been asked to guarantee that New Delhi would do nothing if Pakistan withdrew its troops from the border with India. Islamabad is far from satisfied by mere statements that there is no question of India attacking Pakistan. Still, with all the assurances, Islamabad has hardly withdrawn any forces from the border with India.
Whatever the situation and from wherever you start, you find loads of mistrust. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no alternative to rapprochement between India and Pakistan. President Obama once talked about a regional solution to Afghanistan and other problems between the countries. Little has happened on that front so far.
courtesy: Dawn
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India and Pakistan Fail to Restart Negotiations
By:NEIL MacFARQUHAR
Sep 28,2009
UNITED NATIONS — An attempt by India and Pakistan to agree on resuming either open or back channel negotiations over the full range of their differences stalled on Sunday stuck once more by the fallout from the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai by Pakistani militants.After meeting for nearly two hours on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly the foreign ministers of the two countries Shah Mahmood Qureshi of Pakistan and S.M.Krishna of India said both sides endorsed the idea of resuming negotiations but failed to concur on a timetable.
India without making it an outright condition that resuming talks depended on Pakistan’s prosecuting of those responsible for the Mumbai attacks made clear that substantial progress would be required before negotiations could restart said Salman Bashir Pakistan’s foreign secretary the No.2 in the ministry.“It has not been spelled out in that manner but they want to see some visible action ” Mr.Bashir told reporters at a hotel in Midtown Manhattan where the talks were held.Pakistan had proposed restarting talks before year’s end an idea the Indians did not reject outright but did not accept either he said.
Militants of the Pakistani based group Lashkar e Taiba killed 163 people while rampaging through downtown Mumbai India’s financial capital last November.After repeated delays the trial of eight men accused of helping plan the attack is due to start in Pakistan on Saturday but the Indian government has demanded that the Pakistanis reach higher in the group’s ranks.Both Indian and Western officials blame Hafez Saeed the founder of Lashkar for masterminding the attacks.He was released from house arrest but Mr.Qureshi said he was still being questioned based on evidence presented to the Pakistanis.
India seeks strengthened relations with Pakistan Mr.Krishna said but its neighbor’s fight against terrorist groups needed time to “gather greater momentum.” It is impossible that so few could have been responsible for attacks on the scale of those carried out in Mumbai he said.“We have continuing concerns about the threat from extremism and terrorist groups in Pakistan ” Mr.Krishna said.
The Indian government faced a wave of public criticism last summer after the two countries first issued a joint statement saying they would work on resuming talks.Indians remain unconvinced that the Pakistani government particularly the military and intelligence services have come to see the extremists as a greater threat than India and the territorial fight over Kashmir.The two countries have fought three wars since the violent partition of British India in 1947 but a fourth could have grave consequences given that both now possess nuclear missiles.
Pakistan’s government realizes that its Indian counterpart faces a dubious public Mr.Qureshi said so the Pakistani government will work to change Indian public opinion.Pakistani security forces are hunting about 20 men accused of participating in the Mumbai attack who remain at large he said adding that his country was serious about cracking down because of the hundreds of terrorist attacks carried out in Pakistan.
Courtesy: New York Times
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One step forward, two steps backwards
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
In a wearingly familiar repeat of the on-off pattern of Pakistan-India engagement the latest twist in the diplomatic game is a lack of agreement on how to proceed with the dialogue.
The hope of meaningful re-engagement held out by the July 15 meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries has been eclipsed by Delhi's apparent backtracking on the Sharm El Sheikh understandings. In a characteristic sub-continental replay, a step forward has been followed by two steps backwards. This has created uncertainty about how the normalisation process can progress.
This situation seems, in turn, to have urged Washington and London to direct their efforts to persuading Pakistan and India to revive the diplomatic back channel without necessarily waiting for the formal dialogue to resume. Delhi's response to these urgings is not yet known. Reactivating this channel minus any agreement on the resumption of the composite dialogue raises a number of questions for Islamabad to consider before embarking on such a course.
The Indian government seems to be in no mood to renew the four-year old peace process that it suspended in November 2008 in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attack. Following the Sharm El Sheikh encounter, Delhi has backpedalled on almost all aspects of the joint statement, which raised a political storm in India orchestrated by the BJP. The most significant aspect of the statement was the de-linking of action on terrorism from the composite dialogue. This saw clashing interpretations by Islamabad and Delhi. Pakistan read this as the decoupling of the formal dialogue from the terrorism issue: talks in other words were not to be conditioned on the latter.
Delhi took the opposite view. In Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's remarks immediately after Sharm El Sheikh, as also in his July 29 address to the Lok Sabha, he insisted that "the resumption of talks cannot be a pre-condition for action against terrorists". Under fire from the BJP, he vehemently denied, during a heated parliamentary debate on the issue on July 30, that he had departed from the position that dialogue could only proceed if Pakistan brought the Mumbai attackers to justice. Delhi has also backtracked on two other obligations prescribed by the joint statement: to share real-time information on future terrorist threats as well as the understanding for the foreign secretaries of the two countries to meet as "frequently as required" to determine the agenda of the future dialogue.
Firstly, the Indian Prime Minister's public warning (at a chief ministers' conference on August 17) of another attack being planned in Pakistan seemed to be at variance with the July 16 statement. This prompted the Foreign Office to call in India's deputy high commissioner to seek information and offer cooperation. It also provided an opportunity to remind Delhi of the Sharm El Sheikh agreement "to share credible and actionable information" on any terrorist threat. This has yet to elicit any response from Delhi. On the second count too the Indian government has been dragging its feet. Islamabad invited the new Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, to Islamabad in the first week of September in pursuance of the July 16 agreement for the two foreign secretaries to meet ahead of the foreign ministers' meeting in New York. Delhi has been prevaricating in its response. Instead it has made vague noises about a meeting on the sidelines of multilateral conferences or the UN General Assembly itself -- thereby suggesting an unwillingness to engage in evolving a substantive agenda for the FMs' meeting. If this backtracking is ascribed to India's internal political dynamics it raises the question why the Congress government, re-elected by a handsome margin in May, has been unable to withstand the BJP-led opposition pressure. Why has it allowed the peace process to so easily become a hostage to domestic politics?
Is part of the explanation found in the fact that Prime Minister Singh does not enjoy sufficient authority in the Congress party itself? Is it attributable to shortcomings in his political management? Having raised the tempo of rhetoric and demands on Pakistan to a fever pitch after Mumbai, did he become a victim of the bellicose climate that his government itself created?
In his address to the Lok Sabha, aimed at allaying misgivings, Mr Singh was defensive and unconvincing. By the time he finished his speech he had yielded more space to the opposition than in standing his own ground. Even erstwhile supporters accused him of engaging in "clumsy diplomacy". The key question this raises for Pakistan is whether internal politics is driving a hardening of the Indian posture? With the BJP whipping up an atmosphere of hostility towards Pakistan, will the Congress government then follow an agenda determined by the opposition? Does the ease with which the government caved in to the hardliners betray political weakness or its own lack of will?
These questions have to be carefully weighed by Islamabad to determine and calibrate its future course of action. Meanwhile Washington and London have renewed their efforts to urge Pakistan and India to resume the backchannel. This had previously worked with the Indian national security adviser, Satinder Lambah (and before him JN Dixit) and Tariq Aziz, a close confidante of former president Pervez Musharraf, acting as the interlocutors. Islamabad may now have to decide when to restart backchannel diplomacy and under what circumstances.
Critics of the backchannel that operated during 2004-2008 objected, with justification, to its opaque nature. They also questioned the extent to which the twin tracks – front and back – functioned in synch. Whatever the merits or demerits of the backchannel, the governments of both countries seem to favour the approach, like their predecessors.
Three factors are important for Islamabad to consider. First, the backchannel was intended in the past to work in tandem with the front channel. Formal structured talks addressed a multilayered, wide-ranging, eight-point agenda covering almost the entire gamut of bilateral ties. The backchannel focused primarily on Kashmir (but also other disputes: Siachen and Sir Creek), to explore the parameters of an eventual settlement.
The idea was that progress achieved in the informal channel would be reflected in the composite dialogue process. Decoupling the two therefore makes little sense; the two tracks have to operate simultaneously, and not sequentially. The backchannel is a supplement and not a substitute for the composite talks.
Moreover if Delhi finds it difficult to resume the formal peace process because of domestic compulsions, how will it summon the political strength to show the flexibility that is required in what is envisaged as a dispute resolution track? If the backchannel is employed just to keep the bilateral communication going, which is happening anyway, this will only devalue a vehicle that is meant for more substantive negotiations.
Second, recommencing only the backchannel in the current environment could turn this into a forum focused only on terrorism, in line with what Delhi has already been hinting i.e. to recast the dialogue around one issue. Even before Sharm El Sheikh Indian officials had privately been saying that talks with Pakistan will now be bound by new limits. On its own any unstructured forum will enable this to happen more easily than a framework for structured talks.
Third, re-launching the backchannel without the formal dialogue in place will wrap the entire process of normalisation in unnecessary secrecy and will likely evoke public suspicion rather than support in both countries. For quiet diplomacy to proceed and be politically tenable, formal dialogue is essential, not least because this process lends legitimacy to agreements that may be reached between the principals through their interlocutors on the backchannel.
The two tracks are for good reason inextricably linked and must therefore be in play together. There is also an opportunity to correct the flaws that critics correctly identified in the manner in which the backchannel was conducted in the past.
For Islamabad the most prudent course for now is to continue to engage the Indians, while adopting a posture of studied cool, rather than haste or over-eagerness to rush into talks, whatever the terms. Peace remains the overarching objective, but the process of movement to sustainable peace requires careful deliberation not unconsidered haste.
Aug 25,2009
Courtesy: The News
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India-Pakistan rivalry
By Dr Farrukh Saleem
India and Pakistan are in a state of active hostility — if not war or at least two proxy wars. At least six of the Pakistan army’s nine corps are on the border with India. Of the six, I Corps and II Corps are heavy armour strike corps. At least seven of the Indian army’s 13 corps are on the border with Pakistan. Of the seven, X Corps and II Corps are powerful strike corps (strike corps is an offensive formation). Additionally, all of India’s holding crops that are directly facing Pakistan also have significant offensive capabilities. In effect, 66 per cent of the Pakistan army’s holding and strike formations are directly facing India. In effect, more than 53 per cent of the Indian army’s holding and strike formations are directly facing Pakistan.
Pakistan maintains — and sustains — critical assets in the northeast that have managed to pin down India’s XV Corps, IX Corps, XVI Corps, XIV Corps, XI Corps, X Corps and II Corps. India’s 4 Armoured Brigade, 340 Mechanised Brigade, 11 and 12 Infantry Divisions, Jaisalmer Air Force Base, Utarlai Air Force Base and Bhuj Air Force Base maintain a threatening-offensive posture. India is actively supporting anti-Pakistan Baloch elements as well as anti-Pakistan Taliban factions. India is bent upon projecting power into Afghanistan thus encircling Pakistan. And, India – post-Operation Parakram — has been investing into a "Cold Start War Doctrine" involving joint operations by the Indian army, air force and navy; eight integrated battle groups with armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support.
For FY 2009, India’s defence spending will rise by close to 50 per cent to a colossal $32.7 billion (according to Jane’s Information Group). India is planning its biggest-ever arms purchases; $11 billion fighter jets, T-90S tanks, Scorpion submarines, Phalcon airborne warning and control system, multi-barrel rocket-launchers and an aircraft carrier. At $32.7 billion India’s defence spending translates into 2.7 per cent of GDP.
For FY 2009, Pakistan’s official defence spending is set at $4.3 billion while unofficial estimates go as high as $7.8 billion. If Pakistan were to match India’s rise we would have to spend more than five per cent of our GDP on defence. For the record, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan spend an overwhelmingly large percentage of their GDP on defence. Iraq, Somalia and Sudan are all — or have been — in a state of civil war. For the record, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia use to spend an overwhelmingly large percentage of their GDP on defence. Soviet Union is no more. Czechoslovakia is no more.
The US and the Soviet Union fought a 50-year Cold War during which the Soviet Union stockpiled some 13,000 active nuclear warheads. In 1991, the US won without even firing a shot. The Soviet Union raced a race that it couldn’t win. The Soviet Union split into 15.
Over the past century, economic development has been all about intense trading. Pakistan has two population centres; central Punjab and Karachi. Central Punjab is a thousand kilometres from the nearest port. Between Karachi and central Punjab is a desert in the east and on west is an area that does not — and cannot — support population concentrations. To develop economically, we must trade. Trade we must. And, the only population concentration to trade with is on our east.
Time — and money — is on India’s side. Composite dialogue among civilians means little — if anything at all. What is needed is a strategic dialogue. How can India be persuaded to pull back its offensive formations? In return for what? How can we use our America leverage in our longer-term interest? We cannot win an arms’ race with India. We ought to race a race that we can win. We can continue to race a race that we are bound to lose. Or, begin a new race that we may be able to win — or at least not lose.
Aug16,2009
Courtesy: The News
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Terms of re-engagement
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
The first encounter between President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh since the Mumbai terrorist attack last November marked a tentative thaw in Pakistan-India relations but little else for now.
The June 16 meeting in Yekaterinberg, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, took place in the backdrop of heightened tensions following the Mumbai attack and Delhi's declaration of a halt to the five year old "composite" dialogue. India then set the pre-conditions that Pakistan take action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack and "dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism" for talks to resume.
The suspension of the peace process reinforced the "on-off", "start-stumble-stop" pattern that has characterised the bilateral engagement in a crisis-prone relationship that has been locked in repetitive cycles of sporadic talks, hostility and confrontation.
The latest hiatus in the dialogue occurred despite the commitment made by both countries in a summit level joint statement of April 2005, that they would not allow terrorism to derail the talks. This pledge was reiterated in another joint communiqué in September 2005, in which leaders of the two countries vowed to frustrate any move by terrorists to impede the dialogue.
Delhi's suspension of the formal dialogue in November 2008 mimicked its move in December 2001 in the wake of the terrorist assault on the Indian Parliament , when talks were stalled .They did not resume till the decision at a summit of Indian and Pakistani leaders in January 2004, following a prolonged and unsuccessful exercise in coercive diplomacy by India. Not only has recent history repeated itself but it has underscored the fragility of the peace process that has been so frequently disrupted.
The tone for the Zardari-Singh meeting was set by the Indian leader. In a departure from diplomatic norms, the Indian prime minister publicly declared before the start of the parleys that his "mandate" was to tell his Pakistani interlocutor that "Pakistan should not be used for acts of terrorism against India." This has been widely and correctly read in Pakistan as a public snub to which Mr Zardari curiously failed to respond.
Indian officials went out of their way to insist that this meeting did not presage a resumption of the composite dialogue. Pakistani officials retorted that they had no such expectations in the first place. But tellingly Islamabad did not comment on Mr Singh's assertion that President Zardari made no reference to Kashmir in their meeting.
What came out of the mostly one-on-one meeting was an agreement that the foreign secretaries would meet to discuss the "single subject of terrorism", before the meeting envisaged between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the Egyptian resort of Sharm-el Sheikh on the sidelines of the NAM summit next month. Indian officials said they saw the Foreign Secretaries' meeting as focussed mainly on "stocktaking", to review the steps that Pakistan had taken to address terrorism.
Irrespective of this narrow focus, the diplomatic re-engagement represents a reversal of India's previous stance that it will not dialogue with Islamabad until prior conditions relating to Mumbai are met. What explains this shift even if it remains cloaked in toughspeak?
The answer may lie in a combination of three factors.
One, the behind-the-scenes role played by the US in facilitating the meeting and nudging Delhi towards talks. Washington has understandably been concerned that Indo-Pakistan tensions can derail its plans for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and pursuit of its vital counter-terrorism goals. American officials have been vigorously pressing for an easing of tensions so that Islamabad can focus on fighting militancy on its western border.
During his visit to India on June 10 and 11, US Under-Secretary of State William Burns reiterated the message that Washington supported dialogue between the South Asian neighbours. He also said that a resolution of the Kashmir issue should take into account "the wishes of the Kashmiri people."
This message was subsequently reinforced by President Barack Obama, who said in an interview that "dialogue is the best way to reduce tensions."
A second reason is that Prime Minister Singh has a freer hand to re-engage with Pakistan after his party's resounding victory in his country's elections. In his address to Parliament on June 9, he iterated his intention to "try to make peace with Pakistan again." His strengthened domestic position means he can over ride those who advocate a harder, more bellicose line towards Islamabad.
Three, Delhi's change of stance may reflect the limits of an isolate-Pakistan-internationally policy. After vigorously pursuing a global campaign to vilify Pakistan for the past six months, diminishing returns were setting in for Delhi. In spite of overwhelming international empathy for India in the wake of the terrorist action in Mumbai, Delhi's wont-talk stance did not elicit similar support as time wore on and came to be seen as self defeating. Many read this posture as offering Pakistan a disincentive rather than an incentive to cooperate.
Moreover, non-engagement ultimately becomes unsustainable because a do-nothing approach translates into a gain-nothing one.
The tentative steps towards a diplomatic thaw have been accompanied by indications that Delhi wants to recast the terms of the engagement. Indian officials have purposely leaked the idea that even if formal dialogue is resumed its structure would be "very different" from that pursued earlier. Whether or not this is a pretext for India to wriggle out of meaningful negotiations on Kashmir, any effort to recast an agreed framework for dialogue will be resisted by Islamabad.
It will be a mistake to reconfigure this broad gauge structure for talks that was drawn up in 1997 and sustained for so many years. Although the composite dialogue yielded no agreement on contentious issues and a modest set of confidence building measures, it enabled multi layered talks on the range of issues that reflect the two countries' differing agendas and priorities. Its framework also helped to create a web of multiple interactions between various ministries. Discarding this framework will also risk losing whatever progress was made on different issues during this process.
In any case the framework can hardly be recast to suit one side instead of reflecting mutual agreement. If pushed along these lines Islamabad may prefer to wait it out rather than engage in farcical talks around a unilateral agenda set by Delhi.
Any effort by Delhi to offer a revival of the composite dialogue as a concession to Pakistan should also be resisted by Islamabad. Talks are a means towards an end and a vehicle to achieve an outcome. The dialogue process cannot be held up as a "reward" or quid pro quo. It would be a miscalculation for Delhi to construe Islamabad's consistent call for talks as signalling desperation. Process after all is not sought at the cost of substance.
Be that as it may, there are several reasons that should urge India and Pakistan towards efforts to normalise ties. Four are especially important. First, Pakistan's ability to address the security threat posed by militancy requires calm relations with India. While the militant threat is a clear and present danger Islamabad cannot ignore the more enduring strategic threat that emanates from the adversarial relationship with India. Purposeful talks to address divergences can help mitigate that threat.
Two, Pakistan cannot attain its goal of economic stability and nor can India achieve its full economic potential as also its ambition to secure a seat at the big table while engaged in confrontation. Three, there is a manifest sense in both countries that there is no military solution to the Kashmir dispute or to other problems. Kargil and the 2001-02 military stand off served to confirm this for both sides.
And four, the two countries need to carefully manage their relations in a nuclearized environment. The strategic relationship between the nuclear neighbours remains undefined and potentially unstable. There is no substitute for dialogue to stabilise the nuclear and conventional military relationship.
Durable peace in South Asia will need meaningful talks to establish an architecture of strategic stability in three critical dimensions: finding an acceptable and just solution to Kashmir and institutionalising both nuclear and conventional military restraints.
Ultimately the future of the dialogue, whenever it is renewed, depends on whether the two countries can: a) address and overcome their divergences especially on Kashmir, nuclear-military issues and postures, and Afghanistan, and b) identify and build on the areas of convergence including trade, regional economic cooperation and North-South issues.
June 23,2009
Courtesy: The News
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