Monday, October 12, 2009

Pak-US Relations

Terms of friendship
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
October 20, 2009

The setback to Pakistan-US relations over the Kerry-Lugar law could not have come at a more a critical, even seminal moment for the relationship and the region. Pakistan has embarked upon a decisive military operation against militants in South Waziristan. President Obama is struggling to take crucial decisions on the Afghanistan strategy in which Pakistan will be expected to play a pivotal role.
What should have been a moment to affirm the relationship by a legislative measure to enhance economic assistance became a catalyst for discord. An opportunity to re-calibrate ties was missed in the predicable storm of protest that evidently neither Pakistani nor American officials saw coming. This showed an astounding lack of sensitivity about public sentiment in Pakistan.
It is ironic that the original authors of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009, Senators (now vice president) Joe Biden, John Kerry and Richard Lugar, did not include in their various drafts (and the Senate version adopted on June 24, 2009) the provisions that have provoked so much resentment.
It was the House of Representatives version spearheaded by Congressman Howard Berman whose intrusive clauses prevailed in the end, and that invited the indignant response in Pakistan. Not only did the welter of externally supervised prescriptions defeat the avowed concept of partnership but they were justifiably seen by most Pakistanis as unacceptable encroachments on the country's sovereignty. The measure's hearts-and-minds effect was all but lost in the furore engendered by provisions that oblige regular Administration certifications that Pakistan is adhering to a wide range of conditions.
It would be a mistake to judge the political fallout in Pakistan simply in terms of the parliamentary debate coming to an abrupt and inconclusive end which averted an unfavourable resolution. More important is the negative impression this has left on the public mind and its broader ramifications for a relationship that continues to suffer from a mutual trust deficit.
The government's damage-limitation effort resulted, after the foreign minister's dash to Washington, in a Joint Explanatory Statement issued by the bill's Congressional sponsors aimed at facilitating "accurate interpretation of the text". This persuaded few Pakistanis. Countries are bound by law, not declarations of intent. Moreover the declaration did not address the core issues of public concern.
The willingness of Congressional leaders to issue a statement to assuage opinion in Pakistan does raise an important question. Would accurate and timely communication that sensitized Congressional and Administration leaders to the expected response in Pakistan have helped to remove and amend the controversial clauses? Why were both Pakistani and American officials unable to anticipate and convey these sentiments at the right time, thus avoiding damage to their relationship?
It is important for Pakistani and American officials to accurately read the reaction, learn appropriate lessons and avoid such misjudgements in the future. Three sets of factors explain the depth of the negative response: the substance of the conditionalities, the tone and language and a backdrop of decades of mistrust.
The burden of history is well-known. The rollercoaster nature of the relationship – in which Pakistan has lurched from being America's most allied ally and most sanctioned 'friend' to being cast as a 'double-dealing' country – is deeply embedded in public memory. Given the history of legislatively-driven sanctions and cut-offs in economic assistance and military sales, Pakistanis interpret laws that set unwarranted conditions as an echo of this unhappy past.
For those who heard Vice President Biden assure them during his visit to Islamabad in January that Washington wanted to take relations to the pre-Pressler days, the conditions were at striking odds with that promise, and reinforced a transactional relationship.
The crux of objections to the law turns on its intrusive and expansive benchmarking: linking security assistance to a plethora of conditions. Some official spokesmen argued that as these conditions do not apply to economic assistance, criticism is unjustified. This sets up a false and misleading dichotomy: conditioning any component of assistance means conditioning relations with the country.
The objections on substance involve and imply the following:
* The law mandates the Administration to monitor or secure cooperation from Pakistan in areas ranging from counter-proliferation (unlike non-proliferation this term implies the employment of force), specified areas of counterterrorism to the way military budgets and promotions are made.
* The Act sets up permanent benchmarks that will condition not just security assistance but define the relationship in its other dimensions as well. In fact this 'template' provides a framework within which bilateral relations could henceforth be conducted and possibly emulated by other western nations.
* The conditions reinforce the longstanding perception that the US views its assistance to Pakistan as an instrument to determine aspects of its internal as well as external policies.
* They convey a lack of trust especially in Pakistan's armed forces which also calls into question the value of the cooperation it has offered.
* The conditions will hang like the sword of Damocles over relations much like the Pressler law did.
* Some provisions when read together have been construed as an attempt to probe into Pakistan's nuclear programme. If, as American officials say, these have been misinterpreted, concerns on this count should have been allayed ahead of time as well as efforts made and political capital expended by the Administration to remove legal ambiguities.
* Under the shadow of these conditions every action taken by Pakistan against militancy will be perceived in the country as dictated by Washington, jeopardizing the national consensus that has recently been forged.
Similarly the gratuitous language in parts of the law is exceptionable. Take for example section 203.This mandates a certification by the Administration based on a determination whether the government of Pakistan is making progress on "ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistani military or its intelligence agency to extremist and terrorist groups". Yet the target of this indictment is expected to provide the cooperation the US wants.
The most telling comment on this has come from the American journalist David Ignatius who wrote in The Washington Post that the final bill "had the tone of a dictate" reflecting "a special form of American hubris" and which became "a self-inflicted wound" for Washington. Similarly a Wall Street Journal editorial called the bill's conditions an unwarranted "thumb in the eye of Pakistani national pride."
The Obama Administration would do well to seek to reverse the damage by showing respect and encouraging Congress to also respect the sentiments of the Pakistani people as well as the country's red lines of its sovereignty. The way the US is perceived after all affects the extent of cooperation it can get from any government in Islamabad.
On the Pakistan side of the equation there is much that this affair has revealed about government dysfunction as well as its leadership's non-institutional conduct of the affairs of state and foreign policy, which have become a hallmark of the PPP Administration.
Institutional dysfunction and disconnect, the intensely personalized conduct of foreign policy, bypassing institutions and not taking parliamentary allies and other political forces in to confidence all contributed to Islamabad's flawed engagement with the process leading up to the adoption of the Kerry-Lugar Bill.
Had this not been the case it is conceivable that the outcome might have been different. In part because of its desire to take "sole credit" for the American aid package the government behaved the way it did. In its anxiety to secure the aid package it overlooked its obligation to try to ensure that the law's provisions were not an affront to the country in the eyes of its people.
Courtesy: The News
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O America
By Dr Farrukh Saleem


O America they are saying that you want to destabilise Pakistan. Why did America then vote all of its 371,743 votes at the IMF in favour of a $7.6 billion loan to enable Pakistan implement a stabilisation programme? Why did America then goad the so-called FODP pledge $5.7 billion to Pakistan? Why did the full House pass the $1.5 billion a year non-military assistance to Pakistan? Why did the US Senate pass the $1.5 billion a year non-military assistance to Pakistan? Why did the IMF increase financial support to $11.3 billion?
O America they are saying that you want our bomb. All that we have is a stockpile of 80 warheads. Your peak stockpile was 32,193 warheads. All that we have to our credit is six detonations. You have gone through 1,054 detonations. All that we have is a missile range of 2,500 km but Washington is 11,000 km away and Tel Aviv 3,500 km. We can't hurt you. You have intercontinental ballistic missiles. You have nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We have neither. Why would you want our bomb?
O America they are saying you are going to colonise Islamabad. Yes, H R 111-151, the Congressional report on supplemental appropriations allocates "$896 million for embassy security, construction and maintenance." There's roughly $200 million for 250 new residential units (meaning that there would be at least 250 new staff). The additional allocation makes sense because if America is going to spend a colossal $1.5 billion every year more Americans must be placed in Islamabad to oversee the spending of such large amounts of US assistance. What doesn't make sense is that colonisers colonise in order to extract profits from the lands they colonise but Islamabad is in the Pothohar Plateau and all that the Pothohar Plateau has is undulating terrain, porcupines, wild boars and mongooses.
Just what is the reality about America? America is the biggest economy (America became the biggest a hundred years ago -- when it surpassed England -- and has managed to remain the biggest). America is 4.5 per cent of the world population but produces more than 20 per cent of global GDP. Remember; of the 192 member-states of the UN 191 countries collectively spend $700 billion on defence while America alone spends $700 billion on America's defence. Consequently, if America is in Iraq no power -- other than American public opinion -- can force America out. If America is in Afghanistan no power -- other than American public opinion -- can force America out of Afghanistan. We can continue to dream about bringing America down to its knees but there is a fine line between dreams and reality -- and it's up to us to draw that line.
Just what is the reality about Pakistan? America is Pakistan's single largest export market. America is Pakistan's single largest foreign investor. America is Pakistan's single largest source of expatriate remittances. America is Pakistan's largest forgiver of loans. America is Pakistan army's largest supplier. And yet, our Imran Khans insist that "reality is wrong, dreams are for real".
Uncle Sam is neither Pakistan's friend nor Pakistan's foe. Uncle Sam has interests and America does everything to protect those interests. We need to conduct our own SWOT analysis -- strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Our strength is that America needs us to neutralise the Al Qaeda threat. Our weaknesses are bigger than the Himalayas. We need to capture all the opportunities and decimate our own threats -- with American help -- along the way.

Sep 06,2009
Courtesy: The News
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Great American failure
By Dr Farrukh Saleem


Over the past seven years, direct overt US aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan stand at a colossal $15.449 billion. Of the total, $10.941 billion was security-related and $4.598 billion economic-related. America's economic-related assistance has been under the following seven categories:
1. Economic Support Funds (ESF) totalled a massive $3,488 billion under which the US Congress 'authorised Pakistan to use allocations to cancel a total of about $1.5 billion in concessional debt to the US government'. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, $200 million per year was transferred into Pakistan's account -- in cash -- for Pakistan's budgetary support. 2. Development Assistance (DA) amounting to $286 million. 3. International Disaster Assistance (IDA) amounted to a huge $225 million that –supposedly -- went into the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake plus relief for Pakistan's internally displaced persons. 4. Food Aid of $220 million. 5. Child Survival and Health (CSH) $185 million. 6. Human Rights and Democracy $17 million. 7. Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) $17 million.
To begin with, $4.598 billion economic-related assistance converts to Rs360 billion or Rs2,000 for each and every Pakistani man, woman and child alive. Where has all that gone? Can anyone put together a list of just 2,000 Pakistani men who would acknowledge to having been economically benefited from America's economic-related assistance?
Next, development assistance of $286 million means Rs23 billion -- enough to generate 300 MW of electricity. What has America developed? IDA Rs18 billion, that's huge. The earthquake had left 3.3 million Pakistanis homeless and Rs18 billion means Rs5,500 for each and every homeless. Can anyone collect a mere 5,000 earthquake affected Pakistanis who would admit to American assistance? Next, food aid. Food aid from America is nearly Rs18 billion and that means Rs100 for each and every Pakistan or Rs500 for each and every Pakistani family. There's a sugar crisis and a wheat crisis. Does anyone see the $220 million making any visible impact on the lives of real Pakistanis desperately seeking sugar and wheat on the streets of Pakistan?
Next, America's child survival and health spending in Pakistan -- a huge $185 million but nothing to show for it. Imagine; the government of Japan gave Islamabad a 230-bed children's hospital. Imagine; the government of Japan touches the hearts of 400 a day in the outpatient department plus daily average admissions in inpatient department of 30 plus daily average surgical procedures of 15 plus accident and emergency of an additional 100 per day. Where is Uncle Sam?
At the foothills of Margalla, there is a Japanese park. Then there is Argentine park right next to Federal Government Services Hospital that caters to some 7,000 patients per day. The Chinese built the Karakoram, from Hasan Abdal to Kashgar. But, the Americans have always remained confined to their embassy complex. For the record, 80 million Pakistanis are "unable to secure an adequate nutritional intake" and 80 million are illiterate. Imagine; a mere two per cent of American aid has gone into education. Imagine; a wholesome $4.598 billion has been spent over the past seven years but there's absolutely nothing to show for it.
Now that America firmed up its resolve to touch the hearts of poor Pakistanis -- through the Kerry-Lugar Aid Package -- the elites are feeling left-off. For the first time, in the 60-year history of US-Pakistan relations America wants to build hospitals and schools. For the first time, in the 60-year history of US-Pakistan relations America wants to give to Pakistan's civil society. And, the civil-military elite are feeling left-off. America's direct overt aid remains invisible, concealed, covert and unseen -- all in one. Is this the great American failure in Pakistan -- did America fail to plan in Pakistan or did it plan to fail?
11 Oct 2009
Courtesy: The News
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